Case Study on the Development of Engineering Design Modification Projects for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: A Knowledge Retention Tool in Support of the Longevity and Resilience of the Nuclear Power Industry by Torres-Jiménez, Pamela M.
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Engineering Management & Systems Engineering
Theses & Dissertations Engineering Management & Systems Engineering
Spring 2018
Case Study on the Development of Engineering
Design Modification Projects for U.S. Nuclear
Power Plants: A Knowledge Retention Tool in




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_etds
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Nuclear
Engineering Commons, and the Operational Research Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Engineering Management & Systems Engineering at ODU Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Engineering Management & Systems Engineering Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Torres-Jiménez, Pamela M.. "Case Study on the Development of Engineering Design Modification Projects for U.S. Nuclear Power
Plants: A Knowledge Retention Tool in Support of the Longevity and Resilience of the Nuclear Power Industry" (2018). Doctor of
Engineering (D Eng), dissertation, Engineering Management, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/7af3-1382
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_etds/26
CASE STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGINEERING DESIGN 
MODIFICATION PROJECTS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: A 
KNOWLEDGE RETENTION TOOL IN SUPPORT OF THE LONGEVITY AND 
RESILIENCE OF THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY 
by 
 
Pamela M. Torres-Jiménez 
B.S. December 2006, University of Puerto Rico at Mayagüez 
M.S. December 2010, Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of 
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF ENGINEERING 
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 






Approved by:  
                                                                                    Adrian V. Gheorghe (Director)                                                                                                                                                                 
       Resit Unal (Member)  
                                                                                    Charles B. Daniels (Member) 
       James H. Warren, Jr. (Member) 
                                                                                    Ionut Purica (Member)
ABSTRACT 
 
CASE STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGINEERING DESIGN MODIFICATION 
PROJECTS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: A KNOWLEDGE RETENTION TOOL 
IN SUPPORT OF THE LONGEVITY AND RESILIENCE OF THE NUCLEAR POWER 
INDUSTRY  
 
Pamela M. Torres-Jiménez 
Old Dominion University, 2018 
Director: Dr. Adrian V. Gheorghe 
 
 
The nuclear power industry in the United States (U.S.) has gone through various changes 
throughout its history. Most recently, plans to grow the industry through the construction of new 
power plants have ceased. Because of this, the industry is at a period where the longevity and 
resilience of existing nuclear power plants are vital to its subsistence. 
One of the ways existing nuclear power plants can assure longevity and resilience is by 
performing engineering design modifications efficiently and at a lower cost. Strategic plans, such 
as the Delivering the Nuclear Promise, can support nuclear utilities to achieve this. Another 
strategy to accomplish longevity and resilience is to ensure individuals performing these projects 
possess the proper knowledge to complete tasks efficiently while being cost-effective. 
Knowledge retention is the main purpose of this research project.  
This doctoral dissertation develops a case study for engineering design modification 
projects at nuclear power plants, with the intention of it becoming a knowledge retention tool to 
support the longevity and resilience of the industry. A literature review of subjects such as an 
overview of nuclear power plants, license renewal, resilience, and knowledge management 
comprises the first part of this paper. The literature review is followed by the description of the 
research methodology and the results of the research. Three parts comprise the results section. 
Part one develops a work breakdown structure (WBS) for a design modification project. Part two 
   
 
provides a list of activity descriptions that need to be completed as part of a conceptual design 
package, including estimated person-hours and proposed durations for each activity. The third 
part performs a risk assessment using the Failure Modes and Effects (FMEA) tool. This section 
identifies potential failure modes for each activity, causes of failure, human performance tools 
that can help prevent or detect the failures, and recommends actions to address and mitigate the 
risks identified.  The results of this case study demonstrate how, with the correct knowledge, 
engineering design modification risks can be mitigated and activities can be accounted for when 
developing project estimates. This information can assist the future development of efficient and 
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 Much like any other industry in the world, the nuclear power industry in the United States 
(U.S.) deals with issues such as figuring out how to keep relevant knowledge within the industry 
and how to modify practices to increase overall success. Due to recent plant closures and matters 
related to ongoing new nuclear power plant builds, the industry is in need of improving processes 
with the purpose of completing projects in a shorter time and for a lower cost. This especially 
holds true for engineering design projects. The efficient and cost-effective development of 
engineering design modifications could safeguard the resilience and future of the industry.  
 Instead of building new nuclear power plants, the U.S. nuclear power industry should rely 
on alternative subsistence strategies. One of these strategies is the successful and cost-effective 
development and implementation of engineering design modifications to keep plants operating 
safely and reliably. If utilities can perform these projects in less time and for lower costs, they 
could become proactive in the enhancement of systems, structures, and components (SSCs). This 
strategy can, therefore, increase the longevity of nuclear power plants.   
 With the subsistence of the nuclear power industry in mind, this case study researches the 
history of nuclear power plants in the U.S., among other topics. Subjects such as governance of 
large multi-firm projects, project cost and schedule, risk, knowledge retention issues and 
strategies, initiatives within the industry, and the license renewal process, among others, are 
discussed.   
     
   
 
2 
1.1. Problem Background 
The U.S. nuclear power industry may require large-scale design modifications that call 
for a combination of engineering and project management knowledge and experience to be 
successful.  Project management consists of a comprehensive plan involving a well-defined work 
breakdown structure (WBS), clear timelines, available resources, and a broad understanding of 
potential risks. At the same time, technical knowledge in the engineering field is essential. Due 
to the uniqueness of nuclear power technology, vast regulation, and the continuous effort to 
maintain safety as paramount, engineering design projects can also be considered unique.  The 
uniqueness of engineering projects within this industry makes the documentation of knowledge 
an essential step towards subsistence. 
 
1.2. Research Problem Statement 
The development of an engineering design modification involves various elements such 
as experienced resources with knowledge of the problem and a comprehensive project plan. In 
situations like the 2011 Fukushima response, where the entire U.S. industry set goals to improve 
plants in specific time periods, it is likely that projects need to be developed in short periods of 
time and sometimes using less-experienced resources. As a result, and since at times the 
procedures to follow do not present a straightforward approach on how to accomplish individual 
activities, a clearly-defined example of an engineering design project is needed. In other words, 
the industry is in need of a guide on engineering modifications that can be used by experienced 
resources and entry-level resources alike.  
This paper focuses on the development of a case study for an engineering design 
modification for a nuclear power plant that can be used as an example for developing other 
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engineering projects. The study will focus on, not only explaining what activities need to be 
completed but how to accomplish them successfully.   
The results of this research will provide the nuclear industry with an innovative and 
reliable tool to be used to develop engineering design modifications in the future. The case study 
can later be used as an example to build case studies aimed at other industries. This new tool will 
not only benefit the nuclear industry but will also help others trying to develop a successful 
engineering design project. 
 
1.3. Purpose 
The primary purpose of this paper is to capture the knowledge related to the development 
of engineering design modification projects for nuclear power plants as a knowledge retention 
tool for the U.S. nuclear power industry and is achieved by: 
1. Developing a comprehensive work breakdown structure for an engineering design 
project, 
2. Providing descriptions of each activity, resources needed, and activity durations, 
and  
3. Identifying potential risks involved with each activity and providing a means to 
eliminate or mitigate those risks.  
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1.4. Research Framework 
This research project intends to build a case study for the project design phase of 
engineering design modifications. The resulting case study will serve as a guide for the 
development of successful engineering projects for nuclear power plants. The concepts described 
previously are shown graphically in Figure 1. 






Develop Activity Descriptions, 
Estimates and Schedule
(4.2)







Modification Project for 
Nuclear Power Plant
What activities need to occur 
during the life of the project?
What does each activity mean? 
How long will they take to 
complete? Who should 
complete them?
What risks are associated with each 
activity? What can be done to mitigate 
those risks?













Figure 1. Research Framework 
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1.5. Research Questions 
Once the purpose of the project is addressed, the following research questions will be 
answered: 
1. How is a comprehensive work breakdown structure for an engineering design 
project within the nuclear industry structured? 
2. What processes should take place to deliver a successful project? 
3. What risk(s) could be present? What is the recommended risk response? How can 
these risks impact the overall success of the project? 
The resulting case study will be a guideline that can be used to plan successful 
engineering design projects for nuclear power plants, specifically from the architectural 
engineering (AE) company’s standpoint, rather than from a utility standpoint. Ultimately, the use 
of the case study can decrease the learning curve needed to complete an engineering design 
project successfully, and consequently, reduce utilities' operating costs. This case study will, 
therefore, contribute to the Delivering the Nuclear Promise strategic plan (NEI, 2016). 
 
1.6. Data Collection 
The experimental procedure for this study is centered on providing different person-hour 
estimates and potential risks to different project activities. Data will consist of experience and 
feedback from peers in the nuclear power industry. 
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1.7. Expected Results and Criteria for Evaluating Results 
The final product consists of a scope-specific case study that can be customized for 
specific project scopes. A project work breakdown along with cost estimates and activity 
durations are provided. The criteria to be used to evaluate the results are as follows: 
1. Is the case study comprehensive enough that it can be used by an entry-level 
engineer to develop a design project? 























The literature review for this doctoral dissertation focuses on subjects such as the history 
of nuclear power plants in the U.S., projects, knowledge, risk, and resilience. Each topic is 
reviewed to gain the necessary background to develop and justify this research project. 
The Nuclear Power Plants Overview section gives a broad synopsis of nuclear power 
plants in the U.S. and a brief description of plant designs such as pressurized water reactors and 
boiling water reactors. The primary purpose of this section is to provide the reader with the 
necessary background information to follow this research project. The Accidents in the Nuclear 
Industry section discusses the nuclear events that have shaped the U.S. nuclear industry; the 
Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986), and most recently, the Fukushima Daiichi (2011) 
event, are discussed. The License Renewal section provides a brief description of the license 
renewal process in the U.S. and outlines how it is addressed by nuclear utilities. The governance 
of large multi-firm projects section describes the interaction of multiple firms working on a 
single project for nuclear power plants. The project cost and schedule section provide an 
overview of how educated guesses on cost and schedule affect project's overall risks. The 
strategic fit section discusses how strategic fit affects the success of a company. The subsequent 
sections focus on the topic of resilience and how it relates to economic effects, human 
performance, and the human reliability analysis. These sections are followed by a discussion of 
risk for multi-unit nuclear power plants. The topic of knowledge management within the nuclear 
industry is later discussed. This literature review concludes by considering the Delivering the 
Nuclear Promise strategic plan and the Standard Design Process, which is the focus of this 
research project's case study.  
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2.1. Nuclear Power Plants Overview 
Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) are power generating stations that use radioactive material 
(i.e., uranium) to produce heat in a nuclear reactor. There are two types of NPPs in operation 
within the United States (U.S.): boiling water reactors (BWRs) and pressurized water reactors 
(PWRs). There is a total of 99 NPPs licensed to operate in the U.S. of which 34 are BWRs and 




Figure 2. Location of U.S. Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors (NRC, 2017) 
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BWR plants consist of one thermodynamic cycle composed mainly of a reactor, reactor 
coolant pumps, feed pumps, turbines, condenser, and a generator. Within the reactor water is 
boiled, therefore the term BWR, and steam is produced. Since there is only one cycle the steam 
used to move the turbine is contaminated (i.e., radioactive). A PWR plant consists of two 
thermodynamic cycles. The first cycle includes the reactor, reactor coolant pumps, feed pumps, 
steam generators, and a pressurizer. The second cycle consists of the steam generators, turbines, 
condenser, and the generator. Water is heated to elevated temperatures in the reactor and 
maintained at high pressure by the pressurizer to avoid boiling. The steam generators use the hot 
water (i.e., reactor coolant) to produce steam. The reactor coolant flows through the inside of the 
steam generator tubes, and the steam flows through the outside of the tubes; therefore, the 
contamination of the reactor coolant is not transferred to the steam.  
Nuclear power is considered clean and reliable energy since no greenhouse gases are 
released, and power is generated at high-efficiency levels. Because of its highly radioactive fuel 
and significant consequences in case of an accident, safety is the foremost important aspect of 
nuclear technology. 
 
2.2. Accidents within the Nuclear Power Industry 
In the history of NPPs, there have been a series of accidents that have shaped the 
industry. The most significant being Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986), and most 
recently, Fukushima Daiichi (2011). 
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 Three Mile Island (1979) – The Three Mile Island (TMI) NPP is a two (2) unit 
PWR plant located near Middletown, PA (Figure 3). The TMI unit 2 accident is 
so far the most serious nuclear accident in the history of the United States. The 
cause of the accident was a combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, 
and component failures (NRC, 2014), which created a deficiency in the plant’s 
cooling system that led to a partial meltdown of the reactor core and a small 
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 Chernobyl (1986) – The Chernobyl NPP was a 4 unit pressurized water-cooled 
reactor plant (unique soviet RBMK-1000 design) located in Chernobyl, Ukraine 
(Figure 4). The Chernobyl Unit 4 accident caused by a sudden surge of power, 
destroyed the reactor and released massive amounts of radioactive material into 
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 Fukushima Daiichi (2011) – The Fukushima Daiichi NPP is a 6-unit BWR plant 
located in the Futaba District of Fukushima Prefecture, Japan (Figure 5). The 
cause of the Fukushima accident was a 9.0 magnitude earthquake that created a 
15-meter tsunami. The events caused loss of offsite power to the station and 
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The Fukushima Daiichi event in 2011 is the most recent nuclear event. In 
March 2011 a 9.0 magnitude earthquake created a 15-meter tsunami that struck 
the shore of Japan. At the time of the earthquake, 11 reactors from four plants 
were in operation in Japan. All of the reactors proved to be seismically robust by 
automatically shutting down and following emergency procedures. Right after the 
earthquake, the 15-meter (i.e., 49.2-ft) tsunami struck. The flooding caused a loss 
of offsite power at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. As a result, the emergency diesel 
generators took over powering the plant and supporting the plant cooling efforts. 
The tsunami caused flooding which eventually took the diesel generators out of 
service, impeding the cooling efforts. Even though alternate methods were 
implemented, such as dumping sea water in the damaged reactors, the strategies 
were not sufficient. The lack of cooling water caused the fuel to overheat and 
eventually caused a core meltdown which later initiated the release of radioactive 
material. Most of the radioactive releases were created by the lack of cooling 
water on fuel stored in the spent fuel pool.  
As a result of the Fukushima event, the U.S. NRC activated and staffed its 
Emergency Operations Center in Maryland to closely monitor the Japan events 
and assess the potential impact on U.S. nuclear plants and materials (NRC, 2015).  
The NRC also established a taskforce to determine lessons learned from the 
accident and determine if any NRC regulations needed additional measures to 
ensure the safety of nuclear power plants in the U.S. This taskforce created a 
series of recommendations which consist of a series of walkdowns and 
modifications to be done at the nuclear power plants. As a result of the taskforce 
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recommendations, the NRC issued the first regulatory requirement based on 
lessons learned from the Fukushima event in the form of Order EA-12-051, 
“Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool 
Instrumentation”. Since then, projects have been developed, and are being 
implemented, at nuclear power plants to comply with this NRC order. 
All of the described accidents have a shared variable; they all shaped the U.S. nuclear 
industry we have today. The Three Mile Island accident resulted in the establishment of the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (NRC, 2014), founded in December 1979 (INPO, 2017). 
The Chernobyl accident resulted in improvements to nuclear reactors’ operating and emergency 
procedures. The Fukushima accident resulted in the issuance of order EA-12-049, Issuance of 
Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis 
External Events, on March 12, 2012. This order imposes the need for guidance and strategies to 
prevent fuel damage in the reactor and spent fuel pool (SFP) with a loss of power, motive force 
and normal access to the Ultimate Heat Sink. The NRC provided an acceptable approach which 
was outlined in Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2012-01 issued in August 2012. The Interim 
Staff Guidance endorses the methodologies described in NEI 12-06 Revision 0, Diverse and 
Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, with exceptions, additions, and 
clarifications. Plants in the U.S. approached the order differently but all developed FLEX 
strategies to implement it.  
The process of updating plants to support these strategies required extensive project 
management efforts and collaboration between organizations and firms. The following section 
discusses the governance of large multi-firm projects such as FLEX. 
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2.3. Governance of Large Multi-Firm Projects 
The 2011 paper, “A new governance approach for multi-firm projects: Lessons from 
Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3 nuclear power plant projects,” by Ruuska et al., focuses on the 
construction projects of the Olkiluoto 3 plant in Finland and the Flamanville 3 plant in France. 
Both plants are turnkey plants supplied by Areva, a French nuclear company. For the projects to 
take place, in both instances, various other entities or companies were involved including the 
builders, owner, regulating agencies, and turbine suppliers. One of the essential aspects discussed 
in this paper is how relationships between the entities involved in the project affect the overall 
result of the project. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the supply networks of the Olkiluoto 3 and 
Flamanville 3 projects. Even though the Flamanville 3 network is more complex (i.e., more 
relationships) the project was more successful than the Olkiluoto 3. The reason for this mainly 
was the good relationship between Électricité de France (EDF), the owner and architect/engineer, 
and Areva, the nuclear supplier. Both of these are French companies that have worked together 
on previous projects. Therefore, they understand how one another work, and they work together 
to deliver a successful project. In the case of Olkiluoto 3, Teollisuunden Voina (TVO), the 
owner, had never worked with Areva, making this a first-of-a-kind relationship.  
 
 









Figure 7. The supply network of the Flamanville 3 project (Ruuska et al., 2011) 
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The paper concludes by giving four implications for changes in governing large projects 
that may possess the potential for enhancing both effectiveness and efficiency within large and 
complex projects (Ruuska et al., 2011). These are (Ruuska et al., 2011):  
1. shift focus from a hierarchical contact organization to a supply network 
organization,  
2. project governance should shift from price and mechanism to relationships and 
self-regulation,  
3. view large multi-firm projects as incorporated in the business interest and not as 
temporary endeavors, and  
4. focus on an open system view of managing projects instead of a narrow view.  
The application of these implications to a design modification can improve the efficiency of such 
projects. At the same time, some of the potentials risks involved with the interaction of various 
firms can be mitigated or even eliminated, therefore improving the project’s cost and schedule.   
 
2.4. Project Cost and Schedule 
In his 2014 paper, “In the Land of the Blind the One-Eyed Man is King: Using Advanced 
Scheduling and Simulation Techniques to Control Project Risk,” Shannon describes how 
estimating cost and schedule are all educated guesses (2014), and not accurate or realistic 
representations of how long the projects are going to last, or how much they are going to cost. He 
also describes how the accuracy can be enhanced by dividing a big project into smaller 
manageable scopes. Therefore, by better “guessing” the smaller scopes we can come up with 
better “guesses” for the overall project, just by adding the smaller scopes up. The downside of 
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following this approach is that rounding up errors are accumulated and can inflate the final 
estimates for the projects.  
Later, Shannon describes how errors in estimation can be introduced into project 
estimates by using the following project management methods: analogy, parametric estimates, 
historical data, expert opinion, and the “Delphi” technique. All of these methods are likely to 
introduce errors due to, most commonly, lack of data appropriate to the domain being estimated 
(Shannon, 2014). The best way to overcome this issue is to not use single-value data; instead, 
data ranges are most appropriate. Shannon describes that data ranges should consider a minimum 
value, a most likely value, and a pessimistic “worst case” value (2014).  
All of the errors discussed that could be introduced into an estimate, build up into the 
uncertainty of that estimate. Another uncertainty is added by risks. These risks can be 
categorized as technical, cost, and schedule risks. These risks can be managed by the following 
six steps:  
1. identify the risks,  
2. document the risks,  
3. characterize the risks,  
4. prioritize the risks,  
5. develop risk management strategies, and  
6. monitor and control risks.  
Regarding identifying risks, considering risk scenarios instead of single risks gives results 
that are closer to reality (T.-H. Nguyen et al., 2013). After these steps are followed, a more 
comprehensive estimate for cost and schedule can be developed that includes the effects of the 
identified risks. This results in better estimates that are more than just “educated guesses.” 
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2.5. Representations of Nuclear Risk 
In the paper, “Environments, Risks, and the Limits of Representation: Examples from 
Nuclear Energy and Some Implications of Fukushima,” Kinsella (2012) discusses how risks in 
the nuclear industry, concerning unusual events, are often not represented correctly. Because of 
this, some of the events are sometimes under or overestimated. An example given, not directly 
related to nuclear power, is the production of nuclear warheads for the Cold War. The number of 
warheads needed was considerably overestimated (Kinsella, 2012). Under or overestimation can 
mainly occur when there is not enough knowledge on a topic to model, or estimate, the work.  
Regarding nuclear power, Kinsella continues by discussing the effects of the Fukushima 
events on the industry. He explains how lessons learned from the Fukushima events only focus 
on the triggering events of earthquake and tsunamis but fail to identify other possible events due 
to the lack of knowledge. Therefore, the representation of this risk is limited only to the known 
information.  
 
2.6. Strategic Fit 
Van Aduard de Marcedo-Soares et al. (2009) discuss in their paper, “Strategic Fit of 
Project Management at a Brazilian State-Owned Firm: The Case of Electronuclear,” how project 
management strategic fit affect the success of a firm or company. In the paper, Van Aduard de 
Marcedo-Soares et al. give the example of the Brazilian nuclear firm Eletrobrás Termonuclear 
S.A. – Eletronuclear, or just Eletronuclear. The article shows how the lack of strategic fit ends up 
having a negative impact [on a company’s] performance and competitiveness (Marcedo-Soares 
et al., 2009). The research focused on employee interviews to understand the firm’s 
organizational culture and characterize employee’s perception of strategic fit. Various 
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weaknesses on the organization were identified. One of those weaknesses is the lack of project 
management culture, involving policies, procedures and best project management practices 
(Marcedo-Soares et al., 2009). Within the nuclear industry, procedure use and adherence is one 
of the human performance safety culture’s most important behaviors.  
 
2.7. Resilience and Economic Effects 
Dalziell and McManus describe the economic effects of events on organizations in their 
2004 paper on resilience, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity. They also emphasize the need for 
resilient organizations to have resilient communities. The first step to evaluate these 
organizations is to apply a system analysis since organizations are dynamic complex systems. 
The most important aspect is not to isolate components; instead, analyze components as a whole 
since understanding the relationships between various components in a system is the best way to 
analyze the system. System resilience is composed of two main terms, vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity. 
Vulnerability – the human product of any physical exposure to a disaster that 
results in some degree of loss, combined with the human capacity to withstand, 
prepare for and recover from that same event (Dalziell and McManus, 2004). 
Adaptive Capacity – reflects the ability of the system to respond to changes in its 
external environment, and to recover from damage to internal structures within 
the system that affect its ability to achieve its purpose (Dalziell and McManus, 
2004). 
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Dalziell and McManus (2004) also describe resilience as the overarching goal of a system 
to continue to function to the fullest possible extent in the face of stress to achieve its purpose, 
where resilience is a function of both the vulnerability of the system and its adaptive capacity. 
They also describe vulnerability and adaptive capacity as the ease with which the individual, 
community or organization is pushed into this new state is a measure of their vulnerability, while 
the degree to which they can cope with that change is a measure of their adaptive capacity. These 
concepts are shown in Figure 8. The relationship between resilience and recovery is also 





Figure 8. Relationship between vulnerability and adaptive capacity of a system in relation to a 
disaster event (Dalziell and McManus, 2004) 








Overall system resilience is then evaluated using an organization’s key performance 
indicators (KPIs) and the effects of changes in those indicators as a relationship of time. The area 
under the ΔKPI versus time curve is designated as the organization’s (i.e., the system’s) 
resilience (Figure 10).  
 
 




Figure 10. Impact on KPIs as a measure of system resilience (Dalziell and McManus, 2004) 
 
 
For Nuclear Power Plants the term Key Performance Indicator is directly related to the 
concept of Human Performance (HU). 
 
2.8. Resilience and Human Performance 
Resilience engineering suggests that a company must recognize, adapt to, and absorb 
challenges that fall outside the scope of its design and historical experiences (Huber et al., 2008). 
This is also the main purpose of Human Performance (HU). As shown in INPO’s Performance 
Improvement (PI) Model (INPO, 2006), Figure 11, the main areas of HU are performance 
monitoring (finding gaps); analyzing, identifying, and planning solutions (analyzing actions); 
and finally implementing solutions (fixing results).    
 
 




Figure 11. INPO’s Performance Improvement Model (INPO, 2006) 
 
 
McManus, Seville, Vargo, and Brunsdon (2008) define resilience of an organization as a 
function of the overall situation awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities, and 
adaptive capacity of an organization in a complex, dynamic, and interdependent environment. As 
mentioned previously, a nuclear power plant is a complex, dynamic, and interdependent 
environment. Now, let’s look closely at this definition of organizational resilience and the 
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2.8.1. Overall Situational Awareness  
Tools such as task-review, technical task review, job-site review, questioning attitude, 
and three-way communications, all under the fundamental HU tools for workers, engineers and 
knowledge workers, describe the overall situational awareness variable. When looking at INPO’s 
PI model, we can locate resilience overall situational awareness under the performance 
monitoring area.  
 
2.8.2. Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities  
Tools such as pre-job briefing, concurrent verification, turnover, and post-job reviews, all 
under the conditional and verification HU tools for workers, engineers and knowledge workers, 
address the management of keystone vulnerabilities variable. This variable is the analyzing, 
identifying, and planning solutions under INPO’s PI model. This variable also involves the 
tracking and trending of HU KPIs. 
 
2.8.3. Adaptive Capacity 
Adaptive capacity is closely related to the communication of HU KPIs and is the 
implementing solutions area under INPO’s PI model. By communicating HU events and HU 
clock resets, personnel become aware of the HU status in their plant and/or department and 
become more conscious of error likely situations. By doing this, events can be prevented. 
Through communication, interim solutions and corrective actions to previous events are also 
shared.  
Human Performance can be incorporated into the analysis of resilience by integrating it 
to the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). HRA is characterized by the NRC (2005) as the lack 
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of consistency among practitioners on the treatment of human performance in the context of a 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). 
 
2.9. Resilience and Human Reliability Analysis 
Resilience is directly related human reliability analysis (HRA). Boring (2010) defines 
human error as any action or inaction on the part of an individual that decreases the safety of the 
system with which he or she is interacting. HRA consists of three different stages: 
 Modeling of the potential contributors to human error 
 Identification of the potential contributor to human error, and 
 Quantification of human errors 
In the human factors world, HRA is considered unique since it focuses on prediction 
rather than description. HRA predicts vulnerabilities in human actions. These vulnerabilities are 
then analyzed to establish recovery actions which feed into resilience engineering. Boring (2010) 
considers resilience engineering as a young field that has attracted considerable attention already 
and is being heralded as a significant way of thinking about safety. He also describes the basis of 
resilience engineering as a science to optimize safety, not to undermine existing safety.  
Resilience engineering is a complementary undertaking of HRA. HRA’s primary purpose 
is the human recovery to achieve system safety, which is the main purpose of resilience 
engineering. Boring (2010) describes what each of the methods brings to the other.  
 What HRA brings to resilience: 
 Quantitative emphasis 
 Performance shaping factors 
 Systemic view 
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What resilience brings to HRA: 
 Unexampled events 
 Dynamic events 
The interactions between resilience and HRA are the characterization of system safety. 
Overall, by improving the HRA terms within a PRA model, the resilience of a nuclear power 
plant can be achieved. 
 
2.10. Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plant Risk  
Multi-unit risk has recently become a topic of interest when it comes to PRA and is also 
known as multi-unit probabilistic risk assessment (MUPRA). Kim et al. (2016) define multi-unit 
risk as the risk associated with multiple units regardless of the types of radiological sources (i.e., 
reactor or spent fuel pool).   
Based on a recent study of U.S. license event reports (LERs) submitted to the NRC 
between 2000 and 2011, 9% of the LERs submitted affected multiple sites with the most 
common cause of these events being organizational dependencies. This percent accounted for 
41% of the total 9% (Kim et al., 2016).  Some of the organizational dependencies that are 
directly related to the design phase of a project include (Kim et al., 2016): 
 Design issue that affects multiple units 
 Incorrect calculation that is used on multiple units 
 Incorrect technical specifications that have been mirrored for multiple units 
 Incorrect engineering judgment that has been applied to multiple units 
 Poor safety culture which leads to errors of judgment and execution across the 
organization 
   
 
29 
 Latent failures present in the site systems, structures, and components (SSCs) 
(e.g., design issues or incorrect engineering analysis applied to multiple units, 
maintenance errors repeated on several units). 
Even though all of the mentioned organizational dependencies are relevant to the design 
phase of nuclear projects, latent failures in the site SSCs might be the most important one. Aside 
from natural events that can affect multiple units, regardless of the site, common SSCs between 
units pose the greatest risk of failure and can be the cause of the rest of the organizational 
dependencies.  
Out of the 100 NPPs licensed to operate in the U.S., 25 are single-unit sites, nine units are 
part of a three-unit site (3 sites), and 66 units are part of dual-unit sites (33 sites) (NRC, 2017). 
As of early 2018 there are no sites with more than 3 operating units in the U.S. Soon, as early as 
2020, with the construction of the Units 3 and 4 at Vogtle in Georgia, the U.S. will count with 25 
single-unit sites, 62 units in dual-unit sites (31 sites), 9 units in three-unit sites (3 sites), and 4 
units in a four-unit site (1 site), not accounting for any plant closures in the near future. This new 
scenario will make Vogtle a one of a kind site in the U.S.  
With the soon to be U.S. nuclear fleet panorama, multi-unit risk (see Figure 12 for 
example) is more relevant than ever. Human errors made during the design phase of projects, 
while they are less influential than the general external events in terms of area and scope (Heo et 
al., 2016), still pose a great risk of latent failures. Measures need to be put in place to identify 
these risks early in the design process.  
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Figure 12. Example of Multi-Unit Risk 
 
 
2.11. Nuclear Knowledge Management  
Knowledge is the correct interpretation of data (Yanev, 2013). The management of 
nuclear knowledge has become an ongoing issue in the commercial nuclear power industry. This 
issue emerges from the fact that the nuclear power workforce is aging. The most knowledgeable 
workers within the industry, many of whom have dedicated their entire professional careers to 
nuclear and have been around since the design and construction of the majority of nuclear power 
plants in the U.S., are retiring and taking with them years of knowledge and experience.  
Even though processes within the nuclear industry are usually captured in documents 
such as industry guidelines and procedures (i.e., explicit knowledge (IAEA, 2004)), tacit 
knowledge is not captured. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2004) defines tacit 
knowledge as knowledge that is held in a person’s mind. This knowledge is not typically 
captured or documented and is easy to lose. This tacit knowledge is typically kept by retiring 
employees and is rarely transferred to new or upcoming employees.  The safety of existing and 
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new power plants will directly depend on how we preserve, transfer and further grow nuclear 
knowledge and expertise worldwide (Yanev, 2013).    
One way of retaining tacit knowledge within an organization is to create programs that 
facilitate the transfer of knowledge. This information can be transferred through training or 
mentoring. Even though the new nuclear workforce is required to have formal training, this 
training or education is just the beginning of the training process and much hands-on practical 
experience is also necessary to gain the required competence (Yanev, 2013) to operate a nuclear 
power plant safely. On the other hand, mentoring is a key approach to knowledge transfer, which 
allows for both the explicit and tacit aspects of knowledge to be transferred (Pollack, 2012). 
Another way of capturing tacit knowledge is by documenting the knowledge, which is the 
purpose of this case study, to capture the knowledge related to the development of engineering 
design projects as a knowledge retention tool for the U.S. nuclear power industry.  
 
2.12. Delivering the Nuclear Promise and the Standard Design Process  
Delivering the Nuclear Promise is a strategic plan developed by nuclear energy facilities 
in the U.S. and led by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to strengthen the industry’s 
commitment to excellence in safety and reliability. It assures future viability through efficiency 
improvements, and drives regulatory and market changes so that nuclear energy facilities are 
fully recognized for their value (NEI, 2017). In the strategic plan three focus strategies are 
identified: maintain operational focus, increased value, and improve efficiency (NEI, 2016). As a 
result of these strategies, four building blocks were developed. These are (NEI, 2016): 
 Building Block 1: Analyze cost drivers and identify opportunities to improve 
efficiency. 
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 Building Block 2: Leverage federal and state policies to ensure monetary 
recognition of nuclear energy’s value. 
 Building Block 3: Redesign nuclear power plant processes to improve efficiency 
while advancing the fundamentals of safe, reliable operation. 
 Building Block 4: Implement a communications strategy to ensure industry 
engagement in the initiative. 
This case study is directly related to building block 3. One of the objectives of this 
building block is to develop procedures and processes to facilitate discrete industry efficiency 
initiatives (NEI, 2016). One of these processes is the engineering design process.    
As part of the Delivering the Nuclear Process strategy, NEI has issued a series of more 
than 40 efficiency bulletins (NEI, 2017) including graded approach to walkdowns (EB 16-02), 
optimizing FLEX equipment preventive maintenance strategies (EB 16-17), standardization of 
in-processing training (EB 16-26b), and standard design change process (EB 17-06), among 
others. Efficiency Bulletin 17-06 (NEI, 2017), Implement Standard Design Process, provides a 
detailed description of this efficiency opportunity. One of the reasons for implementing this 
change, which applies to the entire industry, is to address the administrative burden and 
complexity for developing design changes (i.e., streamline the design process), and avoid 
increased costs and project delays. As it pertains to AE companies, one of the reasons to 
implement this change is to avoid having to maintain unique procedures and training to each 
fleet or site. The selection of design change types is also addressed. This study focusses on full 
design changes.  
The Standard Design Process (SDP) is described in Nuclear Industry Procedure IP-ENG-
001 (2017), issued by the Standard Design Process Steering Committee (SDPSC). This 
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procedure is meant to be used in conjunction with site-specific procedures and is based on 
standard industry guidance, expectations, and operating experience (SDPSC, 2017). The SDP 
covers guidance for the: 
 Initial Scoping Phase 
 Conceptual/Common Design Phase  
 Detailed Design Phase (i.e., for Design Equivalent Change, Commercial Change, 
and Design Phase) 
 Planning Phase 
 Installation/Testing Phase, and 
 Design Closure Phase 
The scope of this case study will focus on the Initial Scoping Phase, the 
Conceptual/Common Design Phase, and the Detailed Design Phase for a full design change since 
it is the most comprehensive of all the change types. This new process will be incorporated into 
Chapter 4 of this case study.   
 
2.13. Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal 
In the United States, nuclear power plants were originally licensed for 40 years. This 
licensing time limit was chosen as default and was a result of the projected lifetime of fossil 
plants (Weinberg, 2004), which was the closest benchmark available. Later, the industry 
determined that nuclear plants were suited to operate for more than 40 years. This resulted in the 
publication of the original license renewal rule by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 
1991, 10 CFR Part 54. An amended license renewal rule was later issued in 1995.  
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The license renewal rule governs the issuance of renewed operating licenses and renewed 
combined licenses for nuclear power plants licensed pursuant to Sections 103 or 104b of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 
(NRC, 2017). This rule allows nuclear power plants to renew their operating licenses for an 
additional period of 20 years. The rule also allows for subsequent renewals of 20-year intervals. 
By the time this report is issued, 84 plants have completed their license renewal application 
process, leaving 15 plants with applications under review, as future submittals, or with no intent 
to submit. Appendix A shows a detailed list of nuclear power plants licensed to operate in the 
U.S. and their license renewal status.  
The scope of a plant’s license renewal is determined by performing an Integrated Plant 
Assessment (IPA). This assessment identifies the SSCs (and their functions) requiring aging 
management to ensure they will be managed to maintain the current licensing basis (CLB) and to 
ensure that there is an acceptable level of safety during the period of extended operation (NRC, 
2017). These SSCs are (NRC, 2017): 
1) Those relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events 
(as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ensure the following functions: 
i. The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; 
ii. The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown 
condition; or 
iii. The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which 
could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to 
in § 50.34(a)(1), § 50.67(b)(2), or § 100.11 of 10 CFR, as applicable. 
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2) All nonsafety-related systems, structures, and components whose failure could 
prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in 1). 
3) All systems, structures, and components relied on in safety analyses or plant 
evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with the 
Commission's regulations for fire protection (10 CFR 50.48), environmental 
qualification (10 CFR 50.49), pressurized thermal shock (10 CFR 50.61), 
anticipated transients without scram (10 CFR 50.62), and station blackout (10 
CFR 50.63). 
The scope of the IPA typically becomes the scope of a plant’s Aging Management Program 
(AMP). 
A portion of the IPA for license renewal consists of component scoping and screening 
evaluation, and Aging Management Review (AMR), of a specific system. This is performed for 
mechanical components, electrical components, and structures. The component scoping and 
screening evaluation determines which passive long-lived system components are within the 
scope of the AMP and subject to an AMR. This is typically done by reviewing P&IDs (i.e., 
process and instrumentation drawings) and performing system walkdowns to confirm P&ID data. 
The AMR demonstrates that the effects of aging are adequately managed such that the 
component’s intended function will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period beyond 
the 40-year plant design basis. The AMR does the following: 
1. Identifies components’ intended functions – For mechanical components intended 
functions may be pressure boundary and heat transfer, among others.  
2. Identifies components’ materials of construction – These may be divided into 
subcomponents depending on material types. For example, a valve may have a 
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carbon steel body subcomponent and a stainless steel bonnet subcomponent. A 
heat exchanger may be divided into shell, tubes, and tube sheet.  
3. Identifies components’ internal and external operating environments – Some of 
the environments typically applied are air, air with borated water leakage, raw 
water, treated water, lubricating oil, soil, and concrete.  
4. Assigns AMR groupings (i.e., material and environment combinations), both 
internal and external – These are identified using guidance from the Nuclear 
Energy Institute (NEI) described in NEI 95-10. An example of an AMR grouping 
may be carbon steel in treated water.  
5. Determines aging effects requiring management – Some of these are the loss of 
material (e.g., crevice corrosion, pitting corrosion, general corrosion, 
microbiological induced corrosion, and cracking, among others). 
6. Identifies the programs that will be employed to manage the aging effects – These 
are identified using guidance described in NUREG-1801 by the NRC, also known 
as the GALL Report (i.e., Generic Aging Lessons Learned). Some examples of 
the programs that may apply to mechanical components are Flow Accelerated 
Corrosion (i.e., XI.M17, referring to the GALL chapter), Boric Acid Corrosion 
(i.e., XI.M10), External Surfaces Monitoring of Mechanical Components (i.e., 
XI.M38), and Water Chemistry (i.e., XI.M2). 
The process just described is later used to implement an AMP at nuclear power plants. 
The AMP consists of a series of activities based on the format provided in NEI 95-10 for 
managing the effects of aging on components (INPO, 2015). The key aspects of the AMP are 
monitoring or inspecting parameters, acceptance criteria, detection of aging effects, preventive 
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actions, trending, and application of operating experience. As it pertains to engineering 
modifications, acceptance criteria are the most relevant aspects of the AMP. When acceptance 
criteria are not met, corrective actions, such as replacement through engineering modifications, 
need to be put in place to ensure that SSCs are maintained under all CLB design conditions 
during the period of extended operation, therefore ensuring the longevity of the nuclear power 
plant. 





The following sections describe the methodology to be used to develop a case study for 
the design phase of engineering projects for nuclear power plants. The research questions, 
research environment, and experimental procedures will be discussed.  
 
3.1. Methodological design and rationale for the design 
The development of this engineering design case study is divided in three parts. Part I 
(Section 4.1), Work Breakdown Structure, displays a comprehensive work breakdown structure 
for an engineering project. The information consists of a list of activities that will need to occur 
throughout the life of an engineering design modification project until completion of the design 
package. Each activity is descriptive and broken down into sub-activities. The activities range 
from the development of the project scope to the implementation and close-out of the project. 
Activities relevant to the development of a conceptual design package are later identified. These 
activities are the foundation of Part II. 
Part II (Section 4.2) of this case study, Activity Definitions and Estimates, consists of 
providing descriptions to the activities identified in Part I. Person-hour estimates are also 
assigned. The descriptions and estimates provided are based on a hypothetical project scope 
defined in Section 4.2 of this case study. This section provides information such as: 
 responsible resource,  
 estimated person-hours needed to complete the activity, 
 possible interactions with other resources, 
 required reviews or oversight, 
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 relationship to other activities, and 
 required procedures or forms to be completed. 
The results of Part II are captured in tables within Section 4.2 and in a project schedule 
developed using the Microsoft Projects software. This information can later be used to develop 
project costs and schedules for other projects. 
Part III (Section 4.3), Risks, consists of evaluating each activity described in Part II and 
identifying potential risks. The activities are evaluated using the Failure Modes and Effect 
(FMEA) risk assessment tool. The third phase will also evaluate the resilience of the overall 
project in order to identify potential cost and schedule obstacles.  
The described methodology relates to the research questions as follows: 
Research Question #1 – How does a comprehensive work breakdown structure for an 
engineering design project within the nuclear industry look like? 
In order to answer this question, a comprehensive list of activities has to be created. 
Some of these activities include: development of a scope summary, identification of impacted 
documents, installations instructions, development of drawings, and programs reviews. Sub-
activities should also be included in order to facilitate the development of person-hour estimate.  
Research Question #2 – What should take place to deliver a successful project? 
Each activity listed within the work breakdown structure should be supplemented with a 
description of what it entails. Industry documents and specific plant procedures can also be 
referenced within each activity description. Estimated person-hours required to complete each 
activity should also be included, including responsible resources. Each activity should also 
include, to the extent possible, lessons learned from industry documents or personal experience, 
among others.  
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Research Question #3 – What kind of risk could I face? What risk response can be identified? 
How can these risks impact the overall success of the project? 
The last portion of the case study will focus on what can go wrong with each individual 
activity. To the extent possible, mitigating strategies for those identified risks should also be 
provided. If mitigating strategies cannot be provided, then possible consequences of accepting 
risks should be discussed.  
 
3.2. Proposed Analysis 
The experimental procedure for this study is based on identifying activities to be 
completed within the development phase of an engineering design project in the nuclear industry, 
describing the activities in detail, providing person-hour estimates for each activity and 
identifying the potential risks each activity could encounter. The final product consists of a 
comprehensive case study that can be customized based on specific project applications. Data 
consists on experience and feedback from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the nuclear 
industry. 
 
3.3. Research Design and Methods 
The design of the research and method to be applied is shown in Figure 1. The research 
consists of three major parts. A Subject Matter Expert (SME) review is performed after each part 
is developed.  
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3.4. Subject Matter Expert Reviews 
SME reviews consist of reviewing the content of a specific part. The scope of each 
review consists of: 
 SME Review #1 – Review Part I, Work Breakdown Structure, of the case study 
and provide comments and/or recommendations on how to improve the content 
based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 SME Review #2 – Review Part II, Activity Definitions and Estimates, of the case 
study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how to improve the 
content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 SME Review #3 – Review Part III, Risks, of the case study and provide 
comments and/or recommendations on how to improve the content based on your 
experience with design engineering projects. 
Three SMEs have been chosen to perform the reviews. Each SME has previous 
experience with design engineering projects within the U.S. nuclear power industry. SMEs are a 
combination of civil/structural engineer, electrical/instrumentation and controls (I&C) engineer, 
and project manager. A combination of these types of SMEs will guarantee reviews from 
different perspectives. As part of the review, SMEs provided professional tittle (including 
engineering discipline if applicable) and a brief description of their experience as it relates to 
design engineering projects. A form, see Table 1, is provided to each SME to record this 
information. A section for comments, including reference to applicable section of the report is 
also provided. Finalized forms include resolution of comments from the author. Results from the 
SME reviews are recorded in Appendix B (Part I), Appendix C (Part II), and Appendix D (Part 
III) of the report.  




SME Title:  




Scope: Review Part I of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on 
how to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
   

















































Table 1. Subject Matter Expert Review Form 





The results of this case study are organized in three parts. Part one (4.1) provides a 
detailed work breakdown structure (WBS) of the most common activities that would take place 
during the design phase of an engineering design modification project (i.e., detailed design 
phase). Part two (4.2) provides a specific scope of work for a nuclear power plant design 
modification and describes activities to be completed as part of a conceptual design. 
Recommended person-hour estimates and activity durations are assigned. The third and last part 
(4.3) uses the Failure Modes and Effects (FMEA) tool to identify and analyze potential risks for 
each activity described in part two. 
 
4.1. Part I: Work Breakdown Structure 
Engineering design modification projects at nuclear power plants are a combination of 
activities that range from the design of an SSC up to implementation. Various resources are 
typically involved in the development of a project. Some of the dedicated resources are the 
project manager (i.e., the overall project lead who focuses on schedule and budget), the 
responsible engineer (i.e., the technical lead who serves as the primary point of contact for the 
development of the design), and resource engineers (i.e., task or discipline-specific engineers, 
also known as design team members by the SDP). Each project starts with the identification of 
an issue. This issue is then evaluated by plant personnel to determine if a physical change to the 
plant is required. Once the problem is evaluated, and a decision is made to make changes to the 
plant, a request is sent to the engineering department to initiate a plant design modification. This 
modification request eventually becomes an engineering project. 
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If the required resources are available, nuclear power utilities typically perform design 
modifications “in-house.” If these resources are not available, utilities reach out to external 
companies to perform the work. This case study is based on an engineering design modification 
developed for a hypothetical nuclear power plant by an external engineering company. The focus 
of this case study is the development of a clearly-defined example of an engineering design 
modification project from the perspective of a responsible engineer that is in the planning or 
estimating stage of the technical portion of a conceptual design.     
The following is a list of activities that should be considered when developing the WBS 
for an engineering design modification project. This list is not comprehensive. Its primary 
purpose is to provide a basis for this case study. A formal process, such as the Standard Design 
Process (SDP) or a plant-specific design process should be followed to develop an accurate WBS 
for a realistic project. The WBS presented here includes activities to be performed as part of a 
detailed design change package (i.e., document). A portion of these activities is required to be 
completed as part of a conceptual design package. These activities are identified by placing an 
asterisk (*) next to each activity. Section 4.2 describes each of these activities. Section 4.2 also 
describes the differences between a detailed design and a conceptual design based on the SDP.  
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WBS.1. Engineering Design Modification 
WBS.1.1. Define Project* 
WBS.1.1.1. Obtain input from Customer and Project Manager 
WBS.1.1.2. Problem Statement 
WBS.1.1.3. Identify Resources Needed 
WBS.1.1.4. Project Scope 
WBS.1.1.3.1. Mechanical Engineering Scope 
WBS.1.1.3.2. Electrical Engineering Scope 
WBS.1.1.3.3. Civil/Structural Engineering Scope 
WBS.1.1.3.4. Instrumentation and Controls (I&C)/Digital/Cyber Security 
Scope 
WBS.1.1.5. Proposed Design Change/Problem Resolution 
WBS.1.1.6. Design Inputs 
WBS.1.2. Identify New and/or Update Affected Design Documents* 
WBS.1.2.1. Obtain Input from Customer’s Design Engineering 
WBS.1.2.2. Identify Affected Design Documents 
WBS.1.2.3. Identify New Design Documents to be Generated 
WBS.1.2.4. Drawings 
WBS.1.2.4.1. Update/Generate Drawings 
WBS.1.2.4.2. Review/Approval 
WBS.1.2.4.3. Submit for Processing 
WBS.1.2.5. Calculations 
WBS.1.2.5.1. Update/Generate Calculations 




WBS.1.2.5.3. Submit for Processing 
WBS.1.2.6. Technical Reports 
WBS.1.2.6.1. Update/Generate Technical Report 
WBS.1.2.6.2. Review/Verification/Approval 
WBS.1.2.6.3. Submit for Processing 
WBS.1.2.7. Specifications 
WBS.1.2.7.1. Update/Generate Specifications 
WBS.1.2.7.2. Review/Verification/Approval 
WBS.1.2.7.3. Submit for Processing 
WBS.1.2.8. Procedures (e.g., plant operating procedures) 
WBS.1.2.8.1. Update/Generate Administrative and Installation Procedures 
WBS.1.2.8.2. Review/Verification/Approval 
WBS.1.2.8.3. Submit for Processing 
WBS.1.2.9. Training Materials 
WBS.1.2.9.1. Update/Generate Training Materials 
WBS.1.2.9.2. Review/Verification/Approval 
WBS.1.2.9.3. Submit for Processing 
WBS.1.2.10. Design Basis Documents 
WBS.1.2.10.1. Update/Generate Design Basis Documents 
WBS.1.2.10.2. Review/Verification/Approval 
WBS.1.2.10.3. Submit for Processing 
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WBS.1.2.11. Other Documents (e.g., data sheets, components lists, supplier 
documents) 
WBS.1.2.11.1. Update/Generate Other Documents 
WBS.1.2.11.2. Review/Verification/Approval 
WBS.1.2.11.3. Submit for Processing 
WBS.1.3. Installation Instructions* 
WBS.1.3.1. Obtain Input from Installing Group or Vendor 
WBS.1.3.2. Detailed Instructions 
WBS.1.3.2.1. Obtain Input from Installing Group (i.e., constructability 
review) 
WBS.1.3.2.2. Obtain Input from Supplier/Manufacturer 
WBS.1.3.3. Bill of Materials 
WBS.1.3.3.1. Obtain Input from Customer (e.g., procurement, engineering, 
installing group) 
WBS.1.3.3.2. Obtain Input from Supplier/Manufacturer 
WBS.1.3.4. Testing Instructions 
WBS.1.3.4.1. Obtain Input from Customer (e.g., test group) 
WBS.1.3.4.2. Obtain Input from Supplier/Manufacturer 
WBS.1.3.5. Submit for Implementation 
WBS.1.4. 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Review* 
WBS.1.4.1. Obtain Input from Licensing Group 
WBS.1.4.2. Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Impacts 
WBS.1.4.2.1. Identify Recommended Changes to the SAR 




WBS.1.4.2.3. Submit for Processing 
WBS.1.4.3. Technical Specification Impacts 
WBS.1.4.3.1. Update Technical Specification 
WBS.1.4.3.2. Review/Approval 
WBS.1.4.3.3. Submit for Processing 
WBS.1.4.4. Operating License Impacts 
WBS.1.4.4.1. Identify Recommended Changes to the Operating License 
WBS.1.4.4.2. Review/Approval 
WBS.1.4.4.3. Submit for Processing 
WBS.1.4.5. Submit to Licensing Group 
WBS.1.5. Programs Impact* 
WBS.1.5.1. Obtain Input from Program Owners and/or System Engineers 
WBS.1.5.2. Cumulative Effects 
WBS.1.5.3. Database Changes 
WBS.1.5.4. Preventive Maintenance 
WBS.1.5.5. Additional Information to Support Design 
WBS.1.5.6. Other Site-Specific Requirements 
WBS.1.5.7. Review/Approval 
WBS.1.6. Project Activities 
WBS.1.6.1. Design Package Inter-Discipline Review/Verification 
WBS.1.6.1.1. Internal/SMEs* 
WBS.1.6.1.2. Customer/SMEs 
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WBS.1.6.1.3. Professional Engineer 
WBS.1.6.1.4. Human Performance/Risk 
WBS.1.6.1.5. Verification 
WBS.1.6.2. Meetings 
WBS.1.6.2.1. Pre-Job Briefs* 
WBS.1.6.2.2. Progress Updates 
WBS.1.6.2.3. Technical/SME 
WBS.1.6.2.4. Industry 
WBS.1.6.2.5. Design Presentations* 
WBS.1.6.3. Walkdowns* 
WBS.1.6.3.1. Pre-Design 
WBS.1.6.3.2.1. Obtain Input from Engineering 
WBS.1.6.3.2. Post-Design/Constructability 
WBS.1.6.3.2.2. Obtain Input from Implementing Group 
WBS.1.6.4. Incorporate comments into design 
WBS.1.6.5. Final signatures and approval  
WBS.2. Implementation Phase 
WBS.2.1. Work Order Creation/Support 
WBS.2.2. Minor Changes to Design due to Implementation 
WBS.2.3. Performance Test Acceptance Report Reviews 
WBS.2.4. Return SSC to Service 
WBS.2.5. Installation Support 
WBS.2.4.1. Outage 




WBS.3. Close-Out/Completion Phase 
WBS.3.1. Tracking of Document Completion 
WBS.3.2. Additional Documentation 
WBS.3.3. Final Reviews/Approvals 






























































































































































































































































































































Figure 13. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Overall  






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 14. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Identify New and/or Update Affected Design 
Documents 
 



































































































































































































Figure 15. Work Breakdown Structure Diagram – Installation Instructions  
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4.2. Part II: Activity Definitions and Estimates 
The scope of an engineering design project, especially for a plant modification, can be 
extensive, as shown in the WBS in Section 4.1. Therefore, projects are typically divided into 
phases. The Standard Design Process (SDP; SDPSC, 2017), shown in Figure 19, identifies six 
major design phases: initial scoping phase, conceptual/common design phase, detailed design 
phase, planning phase, installation/testing phase, and design closure phase. The case study 
presented here focuses on the SDP conceptual design phase (i.e., ~30% of the design (SDPSC, 


































Figure 19. Continued 
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By the time a project is assigned to a responsible engineer, especially one external to the 
plant, the initial scoping phase has already been completed by plant personnel. The next phase is 
the conceptual/common design phase. The common design phase applies to nuclear fleet-level 
designs and evaluations (SDPSC, 2017) and will not be discussed since this case study is based 
on a single unit plant.  
Per the SDP (SDPSC, 2017), a conceptual design includes the following major elements: 
1. Identification of the design scope, 
2. Identification of team members, 
3. Development of the preliminary design inputs, requirements, and deliverables. 
During the conceptual design phase, the entire project structure can be delineated with more 
accuracy; therefore, estimates for future phases can be refined. There is a risk of over-estimating 
or under-estimating a project from beginning to end. Because of this, a phased approach is 
preferable.   
This case study describes a simplified WBS for a hypothetical project scope. It also 
develops project estimates and schedules for a design modification performed for a hypothetical 
nuclear power plant named Nuclear Plant 1. The purpose of this modification is to add a means 
to use filtered water from the Filtered Water Tank (FWT) for alternative or emergency purposes. 
The project focuses on the following overall scope: 
 Install a 6” drain line and valve to the FWT discharge line at Nuclear Plant 1, a 
single unit plant. The FWT is a non-nuclear safety related (NNS) tank containing 
filtered water. 
 The new line is classified as NNS. 
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 One P&ID is required to be updated. This P&ID is also a figure on the plant’s 
Safety Analysis Report (SAR). 
 One pipe support is needed to support the new line.  
 No wall penetrations are required.  
 The responsible engineer for the project will be a mechanical engineer. 
 One (1) civil/structural resource engineer will be involved in the project. 
 The conceptual design shall be completed in 12 weeks.  
 Project weeks are 40-hour weeks, five (5) days per week, and seven (7) hours 
each day (i.e., approximately 87% utilization). 
 25% of the total allotted time will be assigned to the resource engineer.  
The descriptions of each activity and person-hour estimates to complete the activities are 
discussed. As stated previously, this case study will focus on activity descriptions and person-
hour estimates for the development of a conceptual design. 
 
4.2.1. Pre-Job Brief 
As defined by Davenport (2005), knowledge workers have high degrees of expertise, 
education, or experience, and the primary purpose of their jobs involves the creation, 
distribution, or application of knowledge. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 
classifies engineers as knowledge workers. In the 05-002 report, INPO provides a list of tools 
that can be applied to anticipate, prevent, and catch in-process errors (INPO, 2005). All of these 
tools are important to developing a high-quality product and should be applied throughout the 
life of a project. The pre-job briefing tool is an essential tool to apply at the beginning of any 
project and is discussed here.   
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A pre-job brief is a discussion held by the responsible engineer and their responsible 
supervisor to (INPO, 2005):  
1. To ensure the engineer is qualified to perform the assigned task,  
2. To prepare the engineer for what to accomplish, and  
3. To sensitize the engineer to what to avoid and to identify and compensate for 
error-likely situations that could lead to the product jeopardizing the plant or 
person.  
The pre-job brief is the first step to ensure a project is being developed the right way from the 
beginning. Always ensure your direct supervisor organizes or schedules a pre-job brief before the 
start of any activity such as planning and estimating the effort to develop a conceptual design 
package. Pre-job briefs should be used every time an activity is started and can be led by 
responsible supervisors, project managers, and responsible engineers alike. A pre-job brief is a 
tool that can also be used to reduce activity risks as shown in the risk analysis performed in 
Section 4.3.   
 
4.2.2. Procedure Use and Adherence 
The next step on any project, especially a nuclear plant modification project, is to identify 
applicable procedures or documents, and their latest revisions or versions. The controlled (i.e., 
revision or version approved for use) documents can be found in the plant’s controlled document 
repository. As a good practice, never rely on printed procedures or documents that have been 
saved on local folders or personal computer desktops. These are not controlled and can contain 
old information. During the life of a project controlled documents may change, or not change at 
all. Always ensure that the latest procedures and forms are being used or submitted with project 
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deliverables and that the latest versions of documents are being used for updates. Failing to do so 
may cause schedule or operability issues. The same concept applies to training and 
qualifications. Management and individual project contributors should always ensure that 
training and qualifications are current before assigning or starting work.  
 
4.2.3. Project Definition and Pre-Design Walkdown 
The first deliverable on any project should be to define the project scope. The overall 
scope of the project is defined in the initial scoping phase. During the development of the 
conceptual design phase, the scope is expanded to include technical details. The definition of the 
scope should always start with a walkdown and discussions with customer key stakeholders to 
understand the entire assignment, especially to outline the technical information.  
Pre-design walkdowns are essential to define a project and to develop a design. The 
purpose of this walkdown is to get familiar with the system or component that needs to be 
modified and to give the engineer a sense of the magnitude of the work.  Walkdowns are also 
used to confirm information, especially from drawings. Even if a drawing is approved for use, it 
does not mean that it contains accurate or complete information, especially for non-safety related 
systems, since more focus is put on safety-related systems. Walkdowns are excellent tools to 
confirm this information and to guarantee that the design is based on correct, not assumed data. 
Plant or customer key stakeholders are project managers, engineers, or plant operations 
and maintenance personnel familiar with the issue. Interviewing plant operations and 
maintenance personnel can be beneficial to a project since these are the individuals interacting 
with the systems every day. They typically understand how these systems and components work, 
can identify the real issues they face, and can also provide feedback on realistic solutions to the 
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problems. System and component engineers are another excellent source of information. These 
engineers are in charge of the health of systems and major plant components and often perform 
monitoring activities which can provide the backup data to support possible resolutions. Design 
engineers, on the other hand, know how these issues relate to the plant’s design basis. Design 
engineers are vital resources when identifying and updating impacted documents. All the 
resources previously described can also assist in developing the background of the issue.  
The definition of a project typically consists of the problem statement (i.e., what?), 
background description (i.e., why?), and overall resolution of the problem (i.e., how?).   This 
definition should be a comprehensive description of the issue, the reason why it needs to be 
solved, and how will it be solved. The background should also include reference to regulatory 
requirements, system health issues, maintenance issues, or inspection findings that initiated the 
change. The safety classification (i.e., non-nuclear safety related, safety-related, or 
quality/augmented quality) of the project, or system/component, should also be described. The 
project’s safety classification will give the reader or reviewer a sense of how complex the project 
is. Non-nuclear safety-related projects are typically the less complex, while safety-related 
projects are the most complex due to the amount of documentation and evaluations that need to 
be performed to maintain the safety classification. 
To assist reviewers, a detailed description of each engineering discipline’s (e.g., 
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, civil/structural engineering, and I&C 
engineering) scope should also be incorporated. This section is typically completed by the 
responsible engineer but should include input from resource engineers. In the case of our 
simplified case study, this section can be described as follows: 
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 Mechanical Scope – Install a 6” drain line to the exiting FWT 8” spare drain 
nozzle. A 6” gate valve and s threaded cap will also be installed. The line will be 
2’ in length and will not require pipe stress analysis performed. 
 Electrical Scope – None. For the purposes of this simplified case, it will be 
assumed that there are no electrical controls and no heat tracing required. 
 Civil/Structural scope – One (1) pipe support shall be installed on the new 6” 
drain line.  
 I&C Scope – None.  
The definition of a project is an essential part of any design change. This section may 
also change during the life of the project; therefore, it should be revisited during every phase. 
The scope also helps the responsible engineer and project manager on the identification of a 
project team. In our case study, and for technical effort estimation purposes, the only resource 
engineer involved will be a civil/structural engineer. For the remainder of this case study, all 
activity person-hour estimates will be provided for the responsible engineer, who is also the 
mechanical resource engineer, and a civil/structural engineer. In some cases, the responsible 
engineer might not be a resource engineer. Therefore, person-hour estimates should consider 
that. For efficiency purposes, it is preferred that the responsible engineer works in the discipline 
of the most scope. For example, if most of the scope is mechanical, then it is preferred for the 
responsible engineer to be a mechanical engineer. For simplicity, engineering supervision, 
project management, and other overhead charges will be ignored when developing the estimate.  
These charges are typically percentages of the direct engineering cost. 
Since the overall scope of a plant modification is mainly developed during the initial 
scoping phase, the effort to develop the technical portion is based on discussions held with plant 
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personnel, walkdowns, and research of documents. A 20 person-hour estimate for defining the 
project and 60 person-hours for walkdowns will be allocated. In realistic terms, 20 hours would 
be enough to visit the site for a day, interview personnel, and type the information gathered. The 
60-hour allocation for walkdowns will be used throughout the development of the conceptual 
design, up until delivery of the package. Assuming 8 hour days, this translates to 7 to 8 days’ 
worth of walkdowns. The assistance of the resource engineer is also required, which would be a 
portion of the hours assigned to the responsible engineer. In this case, approximately 25% of the 
time would be assigned for project definition and walkdowns, which translates to 5 hours and 15 











Define Project 20 5 1 week 
Walkdowns 60 15 11 weeks 
 
Table 2. Estimate for Project Definition and Walkdowns 
 
 
4.2.4. Design Inputs 
Design inputs are defined by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) as 
the criteria, parameters, bases or other design requirements upon which detailed final design is 
based (ASME, 1974). In other words, the design inputs are the researched information that will 
be used to develop the design. The SDP procedure (i.e., IP-ENG-001), Attachment 10, provides a 
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guide to follow when evaluating design inputs.  Nuclear power plants, as part of a design 
process, might also have specific procedures in place that describe the process of gathering or 
identifying design inputs. These procedures also serve as guides on what parameters to consider 
and what forms or documents need to be completed. Some processes, such as the SDP, are 
industry-wide and provide a standard guide that any plant can apply. 
The SDP procedure provides a comprehensive list of thirty-three (33) design input 
considerations. Some of these include: 
 Design conditions (e.g., pressure and temperature), 
 Codes and standards (e.g., ASME, Institute of Electrical Engineers and 
Electronics (IEEE), American Welding Association (AWS), American Concrete 
Institute (ACI)), and 
 Requirements (i.e., performance, materials, interface, loading, layout, operability, 
redundancy, security, safety, failure, etc.). 
The design inputs document for a plant modification is not a “once and done” document 
or process. The design inputs document is a “living” document that will most likely be updated 
during every phase of the project. Therefore, person-hour estimates should be allocated to this 
activity at every phase of the project.  
Since most of the research for a design occurs during the conceptual design phase, this 
phase should include the biggest effort regarding person-hours to develop design inputs. By the 
time the conceptual design is completed most of the design inputs should be identified and 
confirmed by the customer. Further changes to design inputs occur due to scope changes or 
interface changes that occur throughout the development of the design. Given that this case study 
is based on a 12-week milestone with 11 weeks assigned to developing design inputs and 
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assuming half of the engineer’s time will be spent in research, at least 120 hours should be 
assigned to this effort. Again, 25% of that time will be assigned to the resource engineer. The 











Design Inputs 90 30 11 weeks 
 
Table 3. Estimate for Design Inputs 
 
 
4.2.5. Identify New and/or Update Affected Design Documents 
Permanent modifications to nuclear power plants typically result in changes to the plant’s 
design basis. Documents need to be created or updated to reflect the physical changes made to 
the plant and to maintain the plant’s design basis current. Some of the documents that could be 
created or modified are drawings, calculations, technical reports, specifications, procedures, 
training materials, and design basis documents, among others. The identification, evaluation, and 
initial updates to these documents can be used to define the scope of subsequent design phases, 
such as the detailed design phase. The following sections describe the scope and processes of 
updating these documents. 
 
 




Drawings are graphical representations of the plant’s configuration or design. Based on 
the scope of the hypothetical project used in this case study the scope of this portion would be: 
1. Update the existing P&ID that currently shows the tank with a spare nozzle. 
2. Create a new isometric drawing showing the new piping configuration. 
3. Update existing FWT drawings, most likely a vendor drawing, to either add the 
new piping or reference the new isometric drawing. 
4. Update equipment drawings that potentially show the tanks spare nozzle. 
5. Update any other drawings that use the P&ID as a base. Some of these could be 
safe shutdown drawings or pipe stress analysis drawings. 
6. Create a new drawing to show the design of the new pipe support. 
The creation of a new isometric drawing will aid the engineer in the design and 
constructability of the piping. Since this is a new drawing, it should be developed in some 
Computer Aided Design (CAD) software such as AutoCAD or SolidWorks, among others. 
Depending on the complexity of the design the support of a design technician could be needed 
for this activity. For this case study, it is assumed that the principal and resource engineers are 
both trained and skilled in CAD software and will be performing the drafting task. Having 
engineers trained in the use of CAD software can save time and money in a project since it 
removes one resource and allows the design to rely on the technical expert.  
The update of existing drawings could be more complicated than creating new drawings. 
Depending on the agreements reached with the customer updated drawings might consist of 
markups of PDF (i.e., portable document format) type documents or updates to CAD drawings. 
During the conceptual design phase it is essential to identify the following: 
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1. Are impacted drawings available in CAD? What format or software?  
2. If drawings are available in CAD format, would the customer prefer the 
engineering company to update these or does the customer have the responsibility 
to update them? 
3. If drawings are not available in CAD format, are markups of PDF documents 
acceptable to the customer? What information should those drawing markups 
include? 
The answers to these questions should be used as input when developing the subsequent phases 
of the project. For a conceptual design, PDF copies of identified impacted drawings should be 
obtained from the customer. Markups of these PDF documents should be included as part of 
conceptual design package to serve as a demonstration of the conceptual design. Formal updates 
to drawings should occur after the conceptual design is complete and accepted by the customer.  
 For the purpose of person-hour allocation, for the hypothetical scope, 40 hours will be 
assigned to the development of a new piping isometric drawing, and 20 hours will be assigned to 
the development of a new pipe support drawing. It will be assumed that four (4) additional 
impacted drawings will need to be marked up. A total of 2 hours will be assigned to each 
drawing. Regarding resources, the responsible engineer is in charge of creating the isometric 
drawing and marking up impacted drawings. The resource engineer is responsible for creating 
the new pipe support drawing. Peer reviews of each drawing will also need to be performed. Peer 
reviews of each drawing are also needed at this stage. Peer reviewers provide a defense to detect 
errors and defects before the completion of documents by reading and checking the quality of 
another’s work product (INPO, 2005). At least 1 hour should be allocated for peer reviews. For 
this case study, a total of 6 hours will be allocated for drawing peer reviews. This activity will be 
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performed by additional resources, preferably one mechanical engineer for the mechanical 
drawing and one civil/structural engineer for the civil/structural drawings. The estimates for 











New Drawings 40 20 2 weeks 
Impacted Drawings 8 0 1 week 
Drawing Peer Review 0 0 1 week 
 
Table 4. Estimate for Drawings and Peer Reviews 
 







New Drawings 0 0 2 weeks 
Impacted Drawings 0 0 1 week 
Drawing Peer Review 5 1 1 week 
 









Calculations are mathematical representations performed to show the results of an 
analysis. Each nuclear power plant should have procedures that describe the process utilized 
when performing calculations. In this case study, we can assume that two (2) calculations will be 
needed, a hydraulic calculation and a pipe support calculation.  
The hydraulic calculation determines the performance parameters of the new FWT drain 
line. This calculation should demonstrate the total flow of water that could be achieved through 
the new line. In the case where a line size is not provided as part of the overall scope of the 
project and a total required flow is provided instead, this calculation would be used to determine 
the size of the pipe required to fulfill the performance requirement. The pipe support calculation 
determines the allowable loads for the designed support. This calculation also determines the 
appropriate sizes of all individual members. Since these calculations will be performed under the 
conceptual design phase, they will be considered preliminary calculations. Formal calculations 
are completed in later design phases. The hydraulic calculation will be performed by a 
mechanical engineer (or responsible engineer). The pipe support calculation will be performed 
by a civil/structural engineer (or resource engineer). A peer review should also be conducted of 
each calculation to ensure that the methods, assumptions, and results of the calculation are 
correct. A total of 40 hours can be assigned to the development of each preliminary calculation. 
Half of this total time, 20 hours, can be assigned to the peer review of the calculation. Assuming 
the engineers will not be dedicated full time to this activity, a total of 2 weeks can be assigned to 
the performance of these calculations, and one week can be designated for the peer review. The 
estimates for person-hours and activity duration are shown in Table 5. 
 











Calculations 80 0 2 weeks 
Calculation Peer 
Review 
0 0 1 week 
 









Calculations 0 0 2 weeks 
Calculation Peer 
Review 
40 0 1 week 
 
Table 5. Continued 
 
 
4.2.8. Technical Reports 
Technical reports are typically created to record engineering analyses or engineering 
positions on a specific topic. Since the scope of this modification is simple and only adds a drain 
line to FWT, no particular analyses or engineering positions are created from it. Therefore, for 
this case study, it is assumed that no technical reports are created nor impacted by this 
engineering change.  
 




Specifications are documents that record detailed requirements or characteristics of a 
system, structure, or component. Specifications can be of different types such as design, 
procurement, fabrication, or material, among others. As an example, a procurement specification 
would be required to purchase a safety-related valve to be installed in a radioactive controlled 
area. This specification will include details in size, material, and performance requirements. For 
this case study, since the new line is designated as non-nuclear safety related, the valve to be 
installed will not have any “nuclear” specific requirements and will more than likely be an “off 
the shelf” or “commercial grade” item. Therefore, no specification will be required. Details on 
the valve, such as material and size, would be included in procurement documents. Some of 
these documents could be requests for quotes or purchase orders.   
 
4.2.10. Plant Operating Procedures 
Procedures have for various purposes at nuclear power plants. Some procedures are used 
for administrative purposes and only include descriptions of processes. Plant operating 
procedures are used to perform work in the field. Typically nuclear power plants have designated 
groups or departments that are responsible for updating plant operating procedures.  
There are two (2) approaches to identify impacted procedures. One approach is for the 
responsible engineer or resource engineers to identify the procedures by performing research. 
Another method is to allow stakeholders or reviewers to identify impacted procedures within 
their field of work during design package reviews. The second approach is the most efficient 
since it will enable subject matter experts to identify the procedures and the appropriate impact.  
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For this case study, it is assumed that at the time the project estimate is performed there 
was no knowledge of impacted procedures. Therefore, hours should be allocated for the 
responsible and resource engineers to perform research during the conceptual design phase to 
identify the impacted procedures. At least 20 hours should be assigned to the responsible 
engineer and 10 hours to the resource engineer to perform this task, with a one (1) week time 













20 10 1 week 
 
Table 6. Estimate for Procedures 
 
 
4.2.11. Training Materials 
Training materials are typically those used to train nuclear power operators on the 
maneuver of new systems or components. As with procedures, these training materials are 
identified by stakeholders from the plant’s training department during design package reviews at 
later design phases. Therefore, for this case study, no hours will be allocated to the identification 
or update of training materials.   
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4.2.12. Design Basis Documents 
Design basis documents, or DBDs, are plant-specific documents that describe the high-
level functional requirements, interfaces, and expectations of a facility, structure, system or 
component that are based on regulatory requirements or facility analyses (SDPSC, 2017). These 
documents are an overall description and refer to other specific design documents such as 
calculations and technical reports. DBDs are an excellent source of information on a particular 
system and typically describe all the aspects of that system. Therefore, a scope such as the one 
presented in this case study will impact a DBD. It is more than likely that the FWT, being a 
major component or structure at a plant will be described on a DBD. The specific DBD will 
differ from plant to plant. Specific changes to the DBD will also depend on how much detail the 
plant includes in these documents. For this case study, hours should be allocated to identify 
impacted DBDs (more than one could be impacted depending on how systems are set up) and to 
detect potential changes to the DBD. Both the responsible and resource engineers will be 
performing this activity. A total of at least 20 hours should be allocated to the responsible 
engineer and 10 hours to the resource engineer. Time allotted should be around one week. The 













20 10 1 week 
 
Table 7. Estimate for Design Basis Documents 
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4.2.13. Installation Instructions 
Even though the SDP does not consider detailed installation or testing instructions as 
being part of the conceptual design phase, it is a good practice to start thinking about how the 
design change will be implemented and tested, especially based on the phases of implementation. 
This information can be added to plant specific forms or design package sections, or even to the 
project scope if needed.   
During the conceptual design phase, some important information to add is the materials 
needed to implement the change. This list or bill of materials does not need to be detailed in this 
phase. The list should provide reviewers an idea of the major equipment to be installed or 
procurement long-lead components. For this case study, essential items to list are: 
1. Pipe size, length, and material 
2. Valve types, including vendor and models if available 
3. Pipe support elements and construction materials, and 
4. Fittings (e.g., flanges, gaskets, elbows, pipe caps). 
If available at this stage, adding references to plant stock numbers is also helpful. 
 The materials needed for the design will be identified as the design is developed, 
preferably after drawings are complete. Because of this, the duration of this activity should be 
the duration of the project from the development of drawings to completion of conceptual design 
phase (i.e., 8 weeks). For this case study, a total of 20 hours can be allocated to the responsible 
engineer and 20 hours to the resource engineer. Both engineers, in this case, will be developing a 
separate design, which is piping and pipe support. The estimates for person-hours and activity 
duration are shown in Table 8. 
 











Bill of Materials 20 20 8 weeks 
 
Table 8. Estimate for Bill of Materials 
 
 
4.2.14. 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Review 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Chapter 10 (i.e., nuclear) of the code of federal 
regulation (i.e., CFR), part 50.59, titled “Changes, Tests, and Experiments,” describes the 
conditions by which a licensed nuclear power plant can make changes in the facility as described 
in the final safety analysis report (as updated), make changes in the procedures as described in 
the final safety analysis report (as updated), and conduct tests or experiments not described in the 
final safety analysis report (as updated) without obtaining a license amendment (NRC, 2017) . 
The NRC’s 10 CFR 72.48, titled “Changes, tests, and experiments,” describes the conditions by 
which a licensee or certificate holder may make changes in the facility or spent fuel storage cask 
design as described in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) (as updated), make changes in the 
procedures as described in the SAR (as updated), and conduct tests or experiments not described 
in the final safety analysis report (as updated), without obtaining a license amendment or a 
Certificate of Compliance amendment submitted by the certificate holder. In other words, the 
50.59 and 72.48 reviews are licensing reviews performed to ensure that the changes being made 
to the plant are either covered under the current license or need further review by the NRC. For 
the case study presented here, only the 50.59 applies since the design changes to be performed 
only impact plant systems and do not impact the spent fuel storage cask. 
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Power plants have specific procedures that need to be followed to perform these reviews. 
The process is typically composed of three major parts. The first process is the applicability 
determination (AD) which is the method for determining the appropriate regulatory processes 
and reviews that are required for a proposed activity in accordance with utility-specific 
procedures (SDPSC, 2017). The second process is the screening which determines if the 
proposed change or activities have an adverse effect on SAR described safety functions. The 
third, and last, process is the evaluation which determines if the proposed change or activity 
needs approval from the NRC. Another licensing action that could be required is the update of 
the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). 
The SAR, or FSAR (i.e., Final Safety Analysis Report) as sometimes also called, is a 
plant-specific document that shall include information that describes the facility, presents the 
design bases and the limits on its operation, and presents a safety analysis of the structures, 
systems, and components and of the facility as a whole (NRC, 2017). This document includes 
information such as plant-specific location, results of environmental and meteorological 
programs, descriptions and analyses of SSCs, kinds, and quantities of radioactive materials, and 
facility operation, which includes organizational structure, the conduct of operations, and plans 
for coping with emergencies, among others. Regarding systems, for small scopes as the one 
presented in this case study, the descriptions provided in the SAR typically do not require 
change. However, figures may require changes. In this case study, a P&ID which is also a SAR 
figure is being updated. This change automatically warrants an amendment to the SAR which is 
a separate process from the 50.59/72.48 and should be accounted for as an independent activity 
within the project. 
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During the conceptual design phase, per the SDP, preliminary or draft licensing 
documents should be prepared. The AD is a document that is always required. The screen is 
required if the AD determines it is. The same way, the evaluation is required if the screen 
determines it is. Based on the scope provided for this case study, it is likely that only an AD will 
be required. Also, since it was already identified that the impacted P&ID is also a SAR figure, 
changes to the SAR will be required. Since the 50.59/72.48 review will require extensive 
research of licensing documents (i.e., SAR, Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Operating 
License), mainly by the responsible engineer, a total of 40 hours will be assigned to the 
responsible engineer to perform this activity; 10 hours will be assigned to the resource engineer. 
The activity should be performed in a 2-week timeframe. Since changes to the SAR are required, 
and it is known that the change only involves updating a figure or drawing, a total of 5 hours will 
be assigned to the responsible engineer, with a duration of 1 week. There is no need to allocate 
hours to the resource engineer for this activity. The estimates for person-hours and activity 











50.59/72.48 Review 40 10 2 week 
SAR Update 5 0 1 week 
 
Table 9. Estimate for 50.59/72.48 Review 
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4.2.15. Programs Impact Review 
The review of engineering programs to incorporate any design change impact is included 
in the SDP Design Attribute Review (DAR). The DAR is a review performed during 
development of an Engineering Change to determine applicable or impacted engineering 
disciplines, engineering programs and stakeholders from other departments, areas or programs 
(SDPSC, 2017). For this case study, the first part of the DAR was performed in the scope 
definition when the engineering disciplines were identified. This section focuses on the second 
portion of the DAR, Engineering Topics/Programs.  
A list of engineering topics and programs that could be impacted by a design change is 
shown in Attachment 10 of the SDP (SDPSC, 2017). Some of these include: 
 Environmental Qualification (EQ), 
 Fire Protection, Appendix R, and NFPA 0805 (i.e., National Fire Protection 
Association), 
 FLEX (i.e., post-Fukushima strategies), 
 License Renewal and Aging Management, 
 Maintenance  Rule, and 
 MOVs (i.e., motor operated valves), AOVs (i.e., air operated valves), Relief 
Valves, and Check Valves. 
Another list of engineering programs can also be found in INPO’s document 15-003, “Conduct 
of Engineering Programs at Nuclear Power Stations.” INPO’s document includes a description of 
each program, what caused the program to be created, and the key aspects monitored under the 
program.  
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 During the conceptual design phase, a preliminary review of programs should be 
performed. The process to conduct this review should be part of a plant-specific procedure. 
Usually, forms are provided and should be filled as part of the design change package. For this 
case study, a total of 30 hours will be allocated to this activity for the responsible engineer. The 
impacted programs should be identified by the end of the conceptual design phase. At least two 
weeks should be assigned as the duration time of this activity. Assistance from the resource 
engineer might be needed but are not being assumed in this case study. The estimates for person-













30 0 2 weeks 
 
Table 10. Estimate for Programs Impact Review 
 
 
4.2.16. Design Reviews  
This portion of the process involves two main activities: internal review of the conceptual 
design by each engineering discipline’s SME and stakeholder review by plant personnel. Since 
the engineers working on this conceptual design are external to the plant, a design review should 
be performed by SME’s from the same company or firm as the engineers. This review will 
ensure that the conceptual design is technically correct before presenting it to the customer. 
During other design phases, verification will be needed. The difference between review and 
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verification is that a review can be performed by individuals that are familiar with the design 
while a verification is performed by individuals completely independent from the design. For this 
case study, 20 hours will be allocated to the mechanical review and 10 hours to the 
civil/structural review, with one-week duration. The estimates for person-hours and activity 









SME Internal Review 20 10 1 week 
 
Table 11. Estimate for SME Internal Review 
 
 
4.2.17. Estimates for Next Phases 
By the end of the conceptual design phase the responsible and resource engineers should 
be familiar with the scope of the project and the impact the design change will have on plant 
documents and processes. Therefore, this is the best time to develop person-hour estimates for 
the technical portion of the remaining phases of the project. These estimates might also be 
required by the plant to approve the project to continue to the next stage. Given the scope 
presented for this case study, 20 hours could be assigned to the responsible engineer to develop 
the estimate. Ten total hours should also be allocated for the resource engineer to support the 
responsible engineer with one-week duration. The estimates for person-hours and activity 
duration are shown in Table 12. 
 











Next Phase Estimate 20 10 1 week 
 
Table 12. Estimate for Next Design Phase 
 
 
4.2.18. Conceptual Impact Review Meeting 
A conceptual design meeting should be held after the conceptual design package has been 
issued to the plant. The purpose of this meeting is to present the conceptual design to different 
plant departments, answer questions from stakeholders, and to obtain feedback on the design. In 
some plants, the conceptual design meeting is also a platform for plant management to decide if 
the design should continue to the next phases and to approve the budget to do so. Per the SDP, 
the design package should be submitted to stakeholders at least one week before the meeting. For 
estimations purposes, hours should be allocated for the engineers to develop a presentation for 
this meeting and to attend the meeting. Because of this, 15 hours will be allocated for the 
responsible engineer, and 5 hours will be allocated for the resource engineer’s assistance. It is a 
good practice for all engineering disciplines involved with the design to be present at the meeting 
since technical questions may arise that cannot be answered by the responsible engineer alone. 


















15 5 1 week 
 
Table 13. Estimate for Conceptual Design Meeting 
 
 
4.2.19. Conceptual Design Estimate  
The totals for the conceptual design estimates are shown in Table 14. As mentioned 
previously, these estimates are for the technical portion of the project and should be an input to 




























Define Project 20 5 0 0 1 week 
Walkdowns 60 15 0 0 11 weeks 
Design Inputs 90 30 0 0 11 weeks 
New Drawings 40 20 0 0 2 weeks 
Impacted Drawings 8 0 0 0 1 week 
Drawing Peer 
Review 
0 0 5 1 1 week 
Calculations 80 0 0 0 2 weeks 
Calculation Peer 
Review 




20 10 0 0 1 week 
Design Basis 
Documents 
20 10 0 0 1 week 
Bill of Materials 20 20 0 0 8 weeks 
50.59/72.48 Review 40 10 0 0 2 week 
SAR Update 5 0 0 0 1 week 
Programs Impact 
Review 
30 0 0 0 2 weeks 
SME Internal 
Review 
0 0 20 10 1 week 
Next Phase Estimate 20 10 0 0 1 week 
Conceptual Design 
Meeting 
15 5 0 0 1 week 
TOTAL 468 135 65 11 = 679 hours 
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4.2.20. Conceptual Design Schedule 
The activities and estimates presented in this section can be captured in a schedule as 
shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22. This schedule serves as an input to the project’s overall 
schedule which should be created and maintained by the project manager. The estimate only 
addresses technical activities. Management or financial activities are not covered under this 
estimate. The description of activities and estimates provided in this section will be used to 
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4.3. Part III: Risks 
Risk, by definition, is the product of the likelihood and consequence associated with an 
adverse outcome (INPO, 2015). Project risks can often be identified, and mitigation strategies 
can be put in place to avoid delays in schedule and increases in cost. There are various tools used 
in the industry to identify risks. Some of the most common tools are Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA), Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), Job Safety Analysis (JSA), Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Cause and Consequences 
Analysis (CCA), among others. These tools’ purpose is to identify failure modes, or risks, and to 
find ways to mitigate their effects.  
This case study applies the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) tool to identify 
risks that can arise during the development of the conceptual design discussed in Section 4.2. An 
FMEA is an engineering analysis done by a cross-functional team of subject matter experts that 
thoroughly analyzes product designs or manufacturing processes, early in the product 
development process (Carlson, 2014). Each of the activities included in the conceptual design 
estimate and schedule from Section 4.2 is evaluated to identify potential failure modes, 
determine potential effects of failure, assign severity rating, identify potential causes of failure, 
assign occurrence rating, identify design controls to prevent and detect the failure, and assign 
detection rating. A risk priority number (RPN) is then calculated for each activity. The RPN is a 
numerical ranking of the risk of each potential failure mode/cause, made up of the arithmetic 
product of the three elements: severity of the effect, the likelihood of occurrence of the cause, 
and the likelihood of detection of the cause (Carlson, 2014). The RPN number is then used to 
create graphical representations of potential failure modes for each activity. The purpose of these 
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graphs is to draw attention to the most significant failure modes within each activity. 
Recommendations on how to mitigate the risks are also provided.  
In his 2014 paper, Carlson provides generic FMEA worksheets, severity scales, 
likelihood scales, and occurrence scales. Adapted versions of these are used in this case study. 
Instead of evaluating effects such as safety and regulatory requirements, the severity scale used 
for this case study assesses the impact on rework and safety or operability issues. The scale is 
ranked from “No Effect” to “Safety or Operability Issue” and is based on the effects the failure 
would have on the person-hour effort, schedule, deliverables, outage, and even plant shutdown. 
The likelihood of failure (i.e., occurrence) scale based on the experience the responsible and 
resource engineers have with nuclear power and the engineering design process and how that 
experience can help reduce the likelihood of the activity failures to occur, instead of identifying 
incidents per item. The occurrence scale is ranked from “Very Low” to “Very High” likelihood 
of failure. Instead of focusing on stages of detection, the detection scale is also based on 
engineers’ experience to detect issues. The scale is ranked from “Almost Certain” to “Absolute 
Uncertainty” of detecting issues before reaching the customer. The controls element of the 
FMEA is replaced by human performance (HU) tools that can be applied to prevent or detect the 
failure mode. These tools can be found in INPO’s report number 05-002 (INPO, 2007), “Human 
Performance Tools for Engineers and Other Knowledge Workers.” 
The use of the FMEA tool to manage project risks relates to INPO’s Principles for 
Excellence in Integrated Risk Management as follows: 
 Principle #1 – Corporate and nuclear leaders foster a culture that promotes risk 
awareness and effective risk management (INPO, 2015). Leaders can foster a 
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culture of risk awareness by encouraging the use of risk assessment tools such as 
FMEA.  
 Principle #2 – Individuals take responsibility for identifying and managing the 
risk inherent in their activities and demonstrate a personal commitment to nuclear 
safety (INPO, 2015). This principle is fulfilled by identifying potential failure 
modes for activities performed throughout the project’s life. 
 Principle #3 – High standards of risk recognition, management, and mitigation are 
embedded in corporate and station policies, programs and processes (INPO, 
2015). The identification of potential effects of failure, potential causes of failure, 
and current design controls to prevent and detect failure describes the core of this 
principle.  
 Principle #4 – A consequence-biased approach is applied to risk determination, 
and decision-making reflects an intolerance for unacceptable end states (INPO, 
2015). The calculation of the RPN can help individuals distinguish acceptable 
from unacceptable risks.  
 Principle #5 – Risk is eliminated or minimized through pre-emptive actions based 
on a well-defined understanding of event significance and consequence.  Residual 
risk is mitigated to acceptable levels using compensatory measures (INPO, 2015). 
The development of FMEA recommended actions and RPN describe this 
principle. 
 Principle #6 – Leaders and individuals communicate risk effectively among the 
nuclear division, corporate executives and other key stakeholders, including the 
board of directors (INPO, 2015). After an FMEA is performed for a project, the 
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results of such analysis should be communicated to team members to create an 
awareness of potential risks and to provide possible mitigation techniques.  
 Principle #7 – Periodic effectiveness reviews are performed to promote 
continuous learning and to improve risk management across the organization 
(INPO, 2015). These are translated into the various reviews performed throughout 
the project and stem from peer reviews of individual deliverables to the internal 
review of the design package.   
The accurate application of these principles to the development of a project could 
guarantee excellence, thus  contributing to the Delivering the Nuclear Promise initiative within 
the nuclear industry.  
 
4.3.1. FMEA Severity Scale 
 The severity scale used for this case study is based on the amount of effort that the 
activity’s failure mode could potentially add to the project. The scale is divided into three main 
categories: “Safety or Operability Issue,” “Rework,” and “No Effect.” The “No Effect,” lowest 
ranking category, is based on the failure not affecting project schedule or deliverables. “Safety or 
Operability Issue,” the highest category, is based on the activity failure’ potential to introduce a 
new safety hazard at the plant or to create an operability issue which could lead to a plant 
shutdown. The “Rework” category is divided into eight (8) different ranks. These differentiate 
the effort, in time, needed to recuperate from the error and the effect it will have on the project 
schedule, deliverables, installation, and outage schedule. The generated severity scale is shown 
in Table 15. 
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Category Criteria Rank 
Safety or 
Operability Issue 
Creates a new safety hazard or plant operability 
issue (i.e., leading to plant shutdown)  
10 
Rework 
Significate effort; could impact implementation 
and/or outage schedule 
9 
More than 1 month effort; may have some impact 
on implementation and/or outage schedule 
8 
More than 1 month effort; has some impact on 
schedule and may impact deliverables 
7 
More than 2 week effort but less than 1 month; has 
some impact on schedule and may impact 
deliverables 
6 
More than 1 week effort but less than 2 weeks; has 
some impact on schedule but not on deliverables 
5 
More than 1 day effort but less than 1 week; has 
some impact on schedule but not on deliverables 
4 
More than 1 hour effort but less than 1 day; has no 
impact on schedule nor deliverables 
3 
Less than 1 hour effort; has no impact on schedule 
nor deliverables 
2 
No Effect None 1 
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4.3.2. FMEA Likelihood of Failure Scale 
 The likelihood of failure scale used for this case study is based on the experience the 
responsible and resource engineers have with nuclear power and the engineering design process 
and how that experience can help reduce the likelihood of the activity failures to occur. The scale 
is divided into five (5) categories ranging from “Very Low” likelihood of failure to “Very High” 
likelihood of failure. The “Very Low” likelihood of failure corresponds to engineers having 10 
or more years of experience within the nuclear power industry and having extensive experience 
with engineering modification projects. The “Very High” likelihood of failure corresponds to 
engineers having less than one year of experience within the nuclear power industry and 
engineering modification projects. Ranks were assigned to each category and range from 1 
(“Very Low”) to 5 (“Very High”). The categories in between are focused on experience and 



















Responsible and resource engineers are new (i.e., 
1 year or less) within the nuclear power industry 
and to engineering modification projects. 
5 
High 
Responsible and/or resource engineers are 
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the 
nuclear power industry, but have no experience 
engineering modification projects. 
4 
Moderate 
Responsible and resource engineers are somewhat 
experienced (i.e., five to ten years) within the 
nuclear power industry with at least half of their 
experience focused in engineering modification 
projects. 
3 
Low  Responsible and resource engineers are 
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the 
nuclear power industry with at least half of their 
experience focused in engineering modification 
projects. 
2 
Very Low Responsible and resource engineers are 
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the 
nuclear power industry and have extensive 
experience with engineering modification projects. 
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4.3.3. FMEA Opportunity for Detection Scale 
Similar to the likelihood of failure scale, the opportunity for detection scale used for this 
case study is based on the experience the responsible and resource engineers have with nuclear 
power and the engineering design process. The scale focuses on how the engineers’ expertise can 
help in the detection of failures within the activities before the failures reach or affect the 
customer. The scale is divided into seven (7) categories ranging from “Almost Certain” 
likelihood of failure to “Absolute Uncertainty” when it comes to opportunities for detecting 
failures. Ranks were assigned to each category and range from 1 (“Almost Certain” – failure is 
likely to be detected) to 7 (“Absolute Uncertainty” – failure cannot be detected). The categories 
in between are focused on experience and capability of the resource engineers, similar to the 






















No controls are in place to detect failure. 
Failure cannot be detected. 
7 
Very Low 
Responsible and resource engineers are new 
(i.e., 1 year or less) within the nuclear power 




Responsible and/or resource engineers are 
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the 
nuclear power industry, but have no experience 
engineering modification projects. 
5 
Medium 
Responsible and resource engineers are 
somewhat experienced (i.e., five to ten years) 
within the nuclear power industry with at least 




Responsible and resource engineers are 
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the 
nuclear power industry with at least half of their 




Responsible and resource engineers are 
experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the 
nuclear power industry and have extensive 
experience with engineering modification 
projects. 
2 
Almost Certain Controls are in place to detect failure.  1 
 










 The resources for this case study, as described in Section 4.2, are the principal engineer, 
resource engineer and subject matter experts (SMEs). For this FMEA the following experience 
will be taken into consideration when evaluating the activities: 
 Principal engineer – A Mechanical engineer with more than ten (10) years in the nuclear 
industry and approximately six (6) years of engineering design experience. 
 Resource engineer – Civil/structural engineer with more than twelve (12) years of 
experience in the nuclear industry and approximately four years of engineering design 
experience. 
 SME – The SMEs are mechanical and civil/structural engineers with more than 15 years 
of experience in the nuclear industry and with more than ten (10) years of engineering 
design experience. 
These descriptions will be applied when evaluating the likelihood of failure and opportunity for 
detection for each activity. Most of the activities evaluated next are performed by the responsible 
engineer or by resource engineers. These engineers are experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) 
within the nuclear power industry with at least half of their experience focused on engineering 
modification projects. Therefore, an occurrence rating of 2 and detection rating of 3 is assigned 
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4.3.5. FMEA for Define Project 
The definition of the project could be the most important activity in the development of a 
design. This activity defines the entire project. Two failure modes were identified for this 
activity. These are: 
 FM.1.1 – Project not correctly defined 
 FM.1.2 – Not all pertinent information received from the customer 
Table 18 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. As shown in the table, the 
identified failure modes can cause significant issues with schedule and deliverables. Changes in 
scope, especially late during the design, could lead to delays in implementation or even on 
outage schedule. The responsible and resource engineers perform this activity. The severity, 
occurrence, and detection ranking numbers are shown in Table 19 and Figure 23. The FMEA 
table shows FM.1.2, not all pertinent information received from the customer, as being the most 








































































impact cost and 
schedule 
Customer did 




















Research of OE can 
help the customer 
identify issues that were 






of the design 
 



















FM.1.1 7 2 3 42 
FM.1.2 9 2 3 54 
 
Table 19. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Define Project 
 






























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.1.1 FM.1.2
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4.3.6. FMEA for Walkdowns 
As described in Section 4.2.3, walkdowns should be performed pre-design and during the 
development of the design. Three failure modes were identified for this activity. These are: 
 FM.2.1 – Wrong system/component was observed; 
 FM.2.2 – Area cannot be accessed; 
 FM.2.3 – Correct tools (i.e., camera, tape measurer, etc.) are not available. 
Table 20 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU tools 
identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.  
The most severe of the failure modes is FM.2.1. If the wrong system or component is 
observed during a walkdown, this could lead to future changes in design that were not accounted 
for, which could at the same time impact schedule and deliverables. The responsible and 
resource engineers perform walkdowns. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the 
failure modes identified are shown in Table 21 and Figure 24. The FMEA table shows FM.2.1, 
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Walkdowns FM.2.1 7 2 3 42 
FM.2.2 5 2 3 30 
FM.2.3 4 2 3 24 
 
Table 21. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Walkdowns 
 









































Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.2.1 FM.2.2 FM.2.3
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4.3.7. FMEA for Design Inputs 
 During the conceptual design phase, the identification of design inputs is an essential 
task since it will determine how the design will progress. If some design inputs are not 
considered during this phase or are incorrectly identified, this could lead to severe effects. One 
failure mode was identified for this activity. This is: 
 FM.3.1 – Design inputs not considered or incorrectly identified 
Table 22 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.  This failure mode could cause 
significant rework that could lead to changes in schedule and deliverables, especially since there 
is a potential for some of the work for future phases not to have been estimated. The responsible 
and resource engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection rankings for 
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Table 22. Failure Modes, Effects, and Causes, and Recommendations – Design Inputs 



















FM.3.1 7 2 3 42 
 






























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.3.1
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4.3.8. FMEA for New Drawings 
Two failure modes were identified for the identification and creation of new drawings 
activity. These are: 
 FM.4.1 – Not all new drawings are identified; 
 FM.4.2 – Drawing does not capture the scope. 
Table 24 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. Recognizing the need to create 
new drawings during the conceptual design phase is essential since it will determine the amount 
of effort for the next design phases. Even though it best to identify these drawings early in the 
design, it is not imperative to initiate all drawings during the conceptual design phase. The effort 
to recuperate from an error like this could be as easy as listing the drawing within the package. 
This effort can be minimal as long as it is caught during the conceptual design. If drawings do 
not capture the scope correctly, even though it is significant, the effort to correct this failure can 
be easily detected by knowledgeable reviewers. These drawings should be updated as soon as 
possible and before they are presented to the customer.  
All of the identified failure effects could cause rework that could lead to changes in 
schedule and deliverables, especially since there is a potential for some of the work for future 
phases not to have been estimated. The responsible and resource engineers perform this activity. 
The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure modes identified are shown in 
Table 25 and Figure 26. The FMEA table shows FM.4.1, though not all new drawings are 
identified, as being the most significant issue that could affect this activity. 
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FM.4.1 3 2 3 18 
FM.4.2 6 2 3 36 
 
Table 25. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Design Inputs 
 
 





























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.4.1 FM.4.2
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4.3.9. FMEA for Impacted Drawings 
Similar to the development of new drawings, two failure modes were identified for this 
activity. These are: 
 FM.5.1 – Not all impacted drawings are identified; 
 FM.5.2 – Drawing does not capture the scope. 
Table 26 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.  The severity of the failure 
modes identified for this activity is lower than the creation of new drawings since it is not vital to 
identify all impacted drawings during the conceptual design phase, which can be a preliminary 
design. The effort to recuperate from an error like this could be as easy as listing the drawing 
within the package. The responsible and resource engineers perform this activity. The severity, 
occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure modes identified are shown in Table 26 and 
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FM.5.1 2 2 3 12 
FM.5.2 2 2 3 30 
 
Table 27. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Impacted Drawings 
 































Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.5.1 FM.5.2
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4.3.10. FMEA for Drawing Peer Review 
This activity involves the peer review of new and impacted drawings and is performed by 
knowledgeable SMEs. More than one SME might be required depending on the discipline of 
each drawing. Three failure modes were identified for this activity. These are: 
 FM.6.1 – Review did not catch evident errors; 
 FM.6.2 – Reviewer is not the proper SME; 
 FM.6.3 – Reviewer is not qualified to review drawings. 
Table 28 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. As stated in Section 4.2, this 
activity is performed by the knowledgeable SMEs. The SMEs in this case study are experienced 
(i.e., 10 or more years) within the nuclear power industry with extensive experience focused on 
engineering modification projects. Therefore, an occurrence rating of 1 and detection rating of 2 
is assigned. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure modes identified are 
shown in Table 29 and Figure 28. The FMEA table shows FM.6.1 as being the most significant 
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FM.6.1 6 1 2 12 
FM.6.2 5 1 2 10 
FM.6.3 4 1 2 8 
 
Table 29. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Drawings Peer Review 
 
 






























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.6.1 FM.6.2 FM.6.3
   
 
118 
4.3.11. FMEA for Calculations 
Calculations are a vital part of any design. They typically justify a design using 
mathematical evaluations. Calculations can be as simple as calculating the flow through a short 
piece of pipe or as complicated as generating a pipe stress analysis of an entire piping 
arrangement. Due to the amount of effort it takes to complete a calculation (i.e., develop 
technical content, reviews, verifications, etc.) errors such as not identifying impacted 
calculations or not using correct methods can result in adverse effects for a project. Four failure 
modes were identified for this activity. These are: 
 FM.7.1 – Wrong design inputs were considered; 
 FM.7.2 – Impacted calculations were not identified; 
 FM.7.3 – Calculation method is not appropriate; 
 FM.7.4 – Originator is not qualified to perform the calculation. 
Table 30 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.   The responsible and resource 
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure 
modes identified are shown in Table 31 and Figure 29. The FMEA table shows FM.7.2 as being 
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Calculations FM.7.1 6 2 3 36 
FM.7.2 9 2 3 54 
FM.7.3 8 2 3 48 
FM.7.4 6 2 3 36 
 
























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.7.1 FM.7.2 FM.7.3 FM.7.4
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4.3.12. FMEA for Calculation Peer Review 
At the conceptual design phase not correctly reviewing or verifying a calculation could 
impact future design phases. At this stage, the impact is not as severe as the creation of new 
calculations since the review/verification is not final. Final reviews and/or verifications are 
performed after the final design is complete. Three failure modes were identified for this activity. 
These are: 
 FM.8.1 – Verification did not catch evident errors; 
 FM.8.2 – Verifier is not the proper SME; 
 FM.8.3 – Verifier is not qualified to review calculations. 
Table 32 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. SMEs perform this activity. 
The SMEs in this case study are experienced (i.e., 10 or more years) within the nuclear power 
industry with extensive experience focused on engineering modification projects. Therefore, an 
occurrence rating of 1 and detection rating of 3 is assigned. The severity, occurrence, and 
detection ratings for the failure modes identified are shown in Table 33 and Figure 30. The 
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FM.8.1 7 1 3 21 
FM.8.2 6 1 3 18 
FM.8.3 5 1 3 15 
 
Table 33. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Calculation Peer Review 
 
 





























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.8.1 FM.8.2 FM.8.3
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4.3.13. FMEA for Identification of Impacted Procedures 
Plant operating procedures impacted by a design change can be identified during different 
phases of a project, especially during plant stakeholder reviews. These procedures are updated 
after, or right before, a new design is implemented. Non-engineers typically perform the update 
or creation of procedures. Only one failure mode was identified for this activity: 
 FM.9.1 – Not all impacted procedures are identified. 
Table 34 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The responsible and resource 
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure 











































































FM.9.1 4 2 3 24 
 























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.9.1
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4.3.14. FMEA for Design Basis Documents 
Similar to the identification of impacted procedures, the identification of design basis 
documents can be identified during different phases of a project. These documents are updated 
outside of the design process. Markups are typically included in design packages for information 
only. Only one failure mode was identified for this activity: 
 FM.10.1 – Not all impacted DBDs are identified. 
Table 36 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.  The responsible and resource 
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure 







































































FM.10.1 4 2 3 24 
 
























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.10.1
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4.3.15. FMEA for Bill of Materials 
During the conceptual design phase, a preliminary bill of materials (BOM) is developed 
based on the initial design. This list gets refined as the design progresses. A final or complete 
BOM is generated after the final design is complete. Because of this, not identifying all items in 
a BOM, or having errors, will more than likely not have a significant effect on a project. Three 
failure modes were identified for this activity. These are: 
 FM.11.1 – Not all materials were added to the BOM; 
 FM.11.2 – Items identified cannot be purchased or do not exist; 
 FM.11.3 – Customer does not agree on materials chosen. 
Table 38 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.  The responsible and resource 
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure 
modes identified are shown in Table 39 and Figure 33. The FMEA table shows FM.11.3 as being 
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FM.11.1 1 2 3 6 
FM.11.2 2 2 3 12 
FM.11.3 4 2 3 24 
 
























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.11.1 FM.11.2 FM.11.3
   
 
131 
4.3.16. FMEA for 50.59/72.48 Review 
As described in Section 4.2.14, a 50.59/72.48 review is an evaluation of a plant’s 
licensing documentation. Therefore, errors in this review can lead to regulatory issues. For a 
design project, issues with the 50.59/72.48 review can lead to problems in future design phases. 
During the development of a conceptual design this review is preliminary; therefore, changes are 
expected to occur during later phases. Two failure modes were identified for this activity. These 
are: 
 FM.12.1 – Originators are not qualified to perform 50.59/72.48 review;  
 FM.12.2 – Review was not performed correctly. 
Table 40 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.  The responsible and resource 
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure 
modes identified are shown in Table 41 and Figure 34. The FMEA table shows both failure 
















































Always ensure that 
assigned 
individuals are 
qualified under the 





might need to be 
added to later 
design phases  
Individuals 
















ensure they are 
knowledgeable on 
a topic before 
accepting to 
perform work.   
 



















FM.12.1 6 2 3 36 
FM.12.2 6 2 3 36 
 
Table 41. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – 50.59/72.48 Review 
 





























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM12.1 FM12.2
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4.3.17. FMEA for SAR Update 
The update of a plant’s Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is a result of the 50.59/72.48 
review. The severity of not updating the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) correctly, after the final 
design is complete, can result in licensing issues for the plant. Since the changes identified 
during the conceptual design review are preliminary, the severity during this phase is not as 
significant. Only one failure mode was identified for this activity: 
 FM.13.1 – Not all affected sections and/or figures were identified. 
Table 42 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions. The responsible and resource 
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure 
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SAR Update FM.13.1 4 2 3 24 
 
























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.13.1
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4.3.18. FMEA for Programs Impact Review 
The programs impact review performed during the conceptual design phase of a project is 
preliminary, but this does not mean that issues with this review are insignificant. The programs 
impact review typically evaluates a program and also identifies any documents that would need 
to be updated as a result of the implementation of the new design.  An example of this is the Fire 
Protection Program. As part of this program’s review engineers need to identify if the amounts of 
flammable sources in a specific room would be affected. Typically this information is captured 
in a calculation, which at the same time determines the design of the fire protection system 
within the specific room. If the preliminary review of this program fails to identify the impact of 
the new design, this could result in significant rework during future design phases. This rework 
could cause changes in schedule and even deliverables.  Two failure modes were identified for 
this activity. These are: 
 FM.14.1 – Not all impacted programs are identified ; 
 FM.14.2 – Impacted programs are not properly evaluated. 
Table 44 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.  The responsible and resource 
engineers perform this activity. The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure 
modes identified are shown in Table 45 and Figure 36. The FMEA table shows both failure 
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FM.14.1 7 2 3 42 
FM.14.2 7 2 3 42 
 
Table 45. Failure Mode Ranking Numbers – Programs Impact Review 
 






























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.14.1 FM.14.2
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4.3.19. FMEA for SME Internal Review 
The SME internal review is the last control to detect issues with a design package. This 
analysis identified two failure modes for this activity. These are: 
 FM.15.1 – SME is not qualified to perform the review; 
 FM.15.2 – Review identified issues with the content of the package. 
Table 46 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.  SMEs perform this activity. 
The severity, occurrence, and detection ratings for the failure modes identified are shown in 
Table 47 and Figure 37. The FMEA table shows FM.15.2, review identified major issues with 
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Table 46. Failure Modes, Effects, Causes, and Recommendations – SME Internal Review 




















FM.15.1 4 1 2 8 
FM.15.2 6 1 2 12 
 
























Severity (S) Occurrence (L) Detection (D)
FM.15.1 FM.15.2
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4.3.20. FMEA for Next Phase Estimate 
The creation of an estimate and schedule for future design phases is one of the most 
important activities that can be performed during the conceptual design phase, other than the 
development of the design itself. This activity will determine the structure of the remainder of 
the project. Errors in estimate or schedule could affect the outcome of the entire project. Five 
failure modes were identified for this activity. These are: 
 FM.16.1 – Person-hour estimate is over or underestimated; 
 FM.16.2 – Scope changes from the customer; 
 FM.16.3 – Person-hour estimate not accepted by the customer; 
 FM.16.4 – Schedule not accepted by the customer; 
 FM.16.5 – Estimate did not consider all activities to be completed. 
Table 48 describes the potential effect of failure, potential cause(s) of failure, INPO HU 
tools identified for each failure mode, and recommended actions.  The responsible and resource 
engineers perform this activity. The customer controls some of the failure modes identified. 
Because of this, a detection rating of 7 was assigned to these. The severity, occurrence, and 
detection ratings for the failure modes identified are shown in Table 49 and Figure 38. The 
FMEA table shows FM.16.2 as being the most significant issue that could affect this activity and 
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FM.16.1 4 2 3 24 
FM.16.2 9 2 7 126 
FM.16.3 4 2 7 56 
FM.16.4 4 2 7 56 
FM.16.5 5 2 3 30 
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4.3.21. FMEA Conceptual Design Meeting 
No FMEA was performed for this activity. The purpose of this meeting is to present the 
developed conceptual design to plant stakeholders.  No specific activities would be performed by 
engineers or SMEs other than providing a presentation.  
 
4.3.23. Risk Priority Number 
As described previously, the RPN is a numerical ranking of the risk of each potential 
failure mode/cause, made up of the arithmetic product of the three elements: severity of the 
effect, the likelihood of occurrence of the cause, and the likelihood of detection of the cause 
(Carlson, 2014). Figure 39 shows the RPN calculated for each activity under this FMEA. The 
figure shows FM.16.2, "scope changes from the customer," as being the most significant failure 
mode for this design project. Changes in scope by the customer are not detectable. Sometimes, if 
the changes are based on regulatory initiatives, they could be anticipated to some extent. A 
change in scope after a conceptual design has been developed can have a significant impact on 
project cost, schedule, implementation, and even on outage schedule.  
The purpose of comparing the RPN of each activity is to create a sense of significance 
among all the failure modes identified. Other than identifying FM.16.2 as the most significant, 
the RPN graph can give the project team a tool that can be used to prioritize mitigation strategies 
for each failure mode. This graph is a representation of INPOs Principle for Excellence in 
Integrated Risk Management #5. 
 

















































































The introduction to this dissertation presented the background of engineering design 
modification projects in the U.S. nuclear power industry, along with this dissertation’s problem 
statement. Various questions were formulated as part of the research, which is addressed as a 
case study focused on a hypothetical scope. Topics related to the development of engineering 
design modification projects were discussed as part of the literature review, followed by the 
research methodology. The results of the research were divided into three parts and comprised 
the core of this case study. Part one (i.e., Section 4.1) developed a work breakdown structure 
(WBS) for a design modification project. Part two (i.e., Section 4.2) provided descriptions for 
activities to be completed as part of a conceptual design package, estimated person-hours, and 
proposed duration for each activity. Part three (i.e., Section 4.3) comprised a risk analysis using 
the Failure Modes and Effects (FMEA) tool. This section summarizes the conclusions from this 
case study. The limitations of the study, recommendations for future research, and contribution 
to the Engineering Management field of knowledge are also addressed.  
 
5.1. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This dissertation formulated three fundamental research questions to be addressed as part 
of the case study presented here: 
 Research Question #1 – How does a comprehensive work breakdown structure for 
an engineering design project within the nuclear industry look like? 
 Research Question #2 – What should take place to deliver a successful project? 
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 Research Question #3 – What kind of risk could I face? What risk response can be 
identified? How can these risks impact the overall success of the project? 
Research question #1 was answered in Part I of the research results. In this section, a 
WBS for a design modification project was presented. Representations of the WBS were 
presented in Figure 13 thru Figure 18. These diagrams help the reader visualize the process. The 
activities listed in the WBS ranged from the definition of the project scope up to close-out of the 
design package. The WBS revealed that the activities involved in this type of nuclear project 
could be widespread with some of the activities, such as the 50.59/72.48 review, being unique to 
the nuclear industry. These activities are considered part of a detailed design project under the 
SDP. Various activities were identified within the WBS as being needed to develop a conceptual 
design. The identified activities are discussed in section 4.2 of the dissertation, which leads to the 
answer to research question #2.  
The discussion presented in Part II answered research question #2. This section provided 
steps recommended to perform each of the activities successfully. Even though the processes 
discussed should be captured in plant procedures, the descriptions provided in Section 4.2 also 
include insights from SME experience, which are typically not recorded in plant procedures. 
NEI’s SDP was referenced throughout the section. Each activity discussed was assigned person-
hour estimates and durations. These estimates were developed in response to the pre-determined 
scope of the case study. The results from Part I were captured in Table 14. This table includes the 
person-hours assigned to each activity under the responsible resource. This analysis resulted in a 
total of 679 hours needed to complete the technical portion of a conceptual design package. The 
information presented in this table was then incorporated into the Microsoft Project software. 
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The resulting Gantt chart is shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22. The activities described in this 
section are evaluated for risk in Part III.  
Research question #3 was answered in Part III of the research results. This section 
evaluated each of the activities described in Part II using the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) tool.  The process consisted of identifying failure modes for each activity. Each failure 
mode was then evaluated to determine the potential effects and causes of the failure. INPO 
human performance tools were assigned to each failure mode. These tools can be used to prevent 
or detect the failures. Recommended actions to address or mitigate the failure were also 
provided. The results of each activity-specific FMEA were captured in separate tables. Finally, 
each failure mode was assigned a severity, occurrence, and detection rating. The criteria for each 
scale were described in Table 15, Table 16, and Table 17. These ranks were used to calculate the 
risk priority number (RPN). The results from the scale assignment were also captured in separate 
tables. A chart was included to provide a graphical representation of the results. Among all the 
activities described, a total of 37 failure modes were identified and evaluated. The results of the 
overall FMEA were recorded in Figure 39. This chart gives a graphical representation of the 
risks that can be expected for each failure mode. Failure mode FM.16.2, “scope changes from the 
customer,” corresponding to the “Next Phase Estimate” activity, had the highest priority number. 
This result is mainly due to its high severity and detection ranking. The presence of this failure 
could cause a significant amount of rework or even the termination of the project.  Therefore, 
engineers and project managers should pay close attention when performing estimates for later 
design phases.  
The activities described and evaluated under this case study are assumed to be performed 
under a plant-specific quality assurance (QA) program, such as ASME’s NQA-1 (i.e., American 
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Society of Mechanical Engineers’ Nuclear Quality Certification). This QA program governs the 
procedures under which the work is being performed. Some of these plant-specific procedures 
address risks such as the ones identified in Section 4.3 but are typically intended for work 
performed for safety-related structures, systems, and components. This dissertation narrows the 
gap between risk analysis for safety-related and non-nuclear safety-related work. The results 
presented in this paper are expected to assist the U.S. nuclear industry in the identification and 
mitigation of risks beyond what is already addressed in plant-specific procedures.  
The results from this dissertation shall be applied to the development of an engineering 
design modification project iteratively. The recommended actions from the FMEA shall be used 
to adjust activities in the WBS. These actions can also be used to improve estimated person-hour 
and durations for each activity, assign more resources, and change the scope of reviews. Overall, 
this case study can support engineers and projects managers in the development of successful 
projects as a supplement to plant-specific processes and procedures.  
 
5.2. Limitations and Future Research 
The results of this case study are built upon a hypothetical scope for a U.S. nuclear power 
plant. The person-hour estimates and activity durations provided are limited to a conceptual 
design performed under the Standard Design Process (SDP). The literature review presented in 
this dissertation discussed the subject of multi-unit risk. A risk analysis was not performed to 
address this topic since the case study focuses on a design modification to be implemented at a 
single-unit nuclear power plant.  
The SDP addresses multi-unit matters through the development of a common design 
package, listed in Figure 19. The common design process initiates after a conceptual design is 
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developed that contains nuclear fleet-level designs and evaluations that are applicable to more 
than one nuclear site (SDPSC, 2017). The development of an additional risk assessment, along 
with a risk mitigation plan, is a step in the common design process. The risk assessment to 
address multi-unit risk could be the basis for future research and could further expand the 
Engineering Management field of knowledge.  
 
5.3. Contribution to the Engineering Management Field of Knowledge 
The nuclear energy industry is a unique business that relies on the knowledge and 
experience of individuals. Although nuclear power plants utilize countless procedures to perform 
day-to-day activities, the procedures themselves do not capture essential processes set forth from 
experience. With an aging workforce and a large percentage of the nuclear workforce 
approaching retirement, it is up to the new generation to gain this knowledge to move the 
industry forward. One of the ways this can be achieved is by implementing design modifications.  
Design modifications are engineering projects that involve technical problem solving 
along with the management of engineering processes. The development of a case study that 
describes in detail the process of developing engineering projects for nuclear power plants is a 
step towards the documentation of the knowledge needed to successfully develop a design 
modification.  
Old Dominion University (ODU) defines Engineering Management as a specialized form 
of management that is concerned with the application of engineering principles to business 
practice (2017). It also states that the discipline addresses the problems, design, and management 
of projects and complex operations (ODU, 2017). This definition accurately describes the 
foundation of this research as it applies to engineering projects in the nuclear industry. Therefore, 
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this research will contribute to the Engineering Management field of knowledge by providing a 
source of detailed information that can be used as a guide when developing engineering projects 
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The following table is a list of all nuclear power reactors licensed in the U.S. Each 
plant/unit is identified by type, PWR or BRW. Status of License Renewal application is also 
shown.  
 
# Plant Name and Unit PWR BWR License Renewal Application 
Status 
1 Arkansas Nuclear 1 ×  Complete 
2 Arkansas Nuclear 2 ×  Complete 
3 Beaver Valley 1 ×  Complete 
4 Beaver Valley 2 ×  Complete 
5 Braidwood 1 ×  Complete 
6 Braidwood 2 ×  Complete 
7 Browns Ferry 1  × Complete 
8 Browns Ferry 2  × Complete 
9 Browns Ferry 3  × Complete 
10 Brunswick 1  × Complete 
11 Brunswick 2  × Complete 
12 Byron 1 ×  Complete 
13 Byron 2 ×  Complete 
14 Callaway ×  Complete 
15 Calvert Cliffs 1 ×  Complete 
16 Calvert Cliffs 2 ×  Complete 
17 Catawba 1 ×  Complete 
18 Catawba 2 ×  Complete 
19 Clinton  × To be submitted in 2017 
20 Columbia Generating Station  × Complete 
21 Comanche Peak 1 ×  To be submitted in 2022 
22 Comanche Peak 2 ×  To be submitted in 2022 
23 Cooper  × Complete 
24 D.C. Cook 1 ×  Complete 
Table 50. List of Power Reactors in the U.S. and Application Status (NRC, 2018) 








# Plant Name and Unit PWR BWR License Renewal Application 
Status 
25 D.C. Cook 2  ×  Complete 
26 Davis-Besse ×  Complete 
27 Diablo Canyon 1 ×  Under Review 
28 Diablo Canyon 2 ×  Under Review 
29 Dresden 2  × Complete 
30 Dresden 3  × Complete 
31 Duane Arnold  × Complete 
32 Farley 1 ×  Complete 
33 Farley 2 ×  Complete 
34 Fermi 2  × Complete 
35 FitzPatrick  × Complete 
36 Ginna ×  Complete 
37 Grand Gulf 1  × Complete 
38 Hatch 1  × Complete 
39 Hatch 2  × Complete 
40 Hope Creek 1  × Complete 
41 Indian Point 2 ×  Under Review 
42 Indian Point 3 ×  Under Review 
43 La Salle 1  × Complete 
44 La Salle 2  × Complete 
45 Limerick 1  × Complete 
46 Limerick 2  × Complete 
47 McGuire 1 ×  Complete 
48 McGuire 2 ×  Complete 
49 Millstone 2 ×  Complete 








# Plant Name and Unit PWR BWR License Renewal Application 
Status 
50 Millstone 3 ×  Complete 
51 Monticello  × Complete 
52 Nine Mile Point 1  × Complete 
53 Nine Mile Point 2  × Complete 
54 North Anna 1 ×  Complete 
55 North Anna 2 ×  Complete 
56 Oconee 1 ×  Complete 
57 Oconee 2 ×  Complete 
58 Oconee 3 ×  Complete 
59 Oyster Creek  × Complete 
60 Palisades ×  Complete 
61 Palo Verde 1 ×  Complete 
62 Palo Verde 2 ×  Complete 
63 Palo Verde 3 ×  Complete 
64 Peach Bottom 2  × Complete 
65 Peach Bottom 3  × Complete 
66 Perry 1  × To be submitted in 2019 
67 Pilgrim 1  × Complete 
68 Point Beach 1 ×  Complete 
69 Point Beach 2 ×  Complete 
70 Prairie Island 1 ×  Complete 
71 Prairie Island 2 ×  Complete 
72 Quad Cities 1  × Complete 
73 Quad Cities 2  × Complete 
74 River Bend 1  × To be submitted in 2017 








# Plant Name and Unit PWR BWR License Renewal Application 
Status 
75 Robinson 2 ×  Complete 
76 Saint Lucie 1 ×  Complete 
77 Saint Lucie 2 ×  Complete 
78 Salem 1 ×  Complete 
79 Salem 2 ×  Complete 
80 Seabrook 1 ×  Under Review 
81 Sequoyah 1 ×  Complete 
82 Sequoyah 2 ×  Complete 
83 Shearon Harris 1 ×  Complete 
84 South Texas 1 ×  Under Review 
85 South Texas 2 ×  Under Review 
86 Summer ×  Complete 
87 Surry 1 ×  Complete 
88 Surry 2 ×  Complete 
89 Susquehanna 1  × Complete 
90 Susquehanna 2  × Complete 
91 Three Mile Island 1 ×  Complete 
92 Turkey Point 3 ×  Complete 
93 Turkey Point 4 ×  Complete 
94 Vogtle 1 ×  Complete 
95 Vogtle 2 ×  Complete 
96 Waterford 3 ×  Under Review 
97 Watts Bar 1 ×  No intent yet; expires 2035 
98 Watts Bar 2 ×  No intent yet; expires 2055 
99 Wolf Creek 1 ×  Complete 
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Table 51. Summary of Reactors in the U.S. 
 
 
License Renewal Application Status Number of Reactor Units 
Completed 84 
Under Review 8 
Future Submittal 5 
No Intent to Submit Yet 2 
 
Table 52. Summary of License Renewal Application Status for Reactors in the U.S. 
 




Part I Subject Matter Expert (SME) Review 
SME: #1 
SME Title: Project Engineer Electrical/I&C 
Description of SME Experience: 
35+ Years of Engineering and Engineering Management experience on power plant projects, 
including nuclear and non-nuclear projects. 
 
 
Scope: Review Part I of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how 
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 
Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 




hour estimates may be difficult 
unless you have SME's from all 
disciplines and your input is not 
all from WEC.  If your input was 
solely based on information from 
WEC sources, I can foresee some 
WEC legal type not being too 
thrilled.  (i.e., they may consider 
it to be proprietary)  
The recommended person-hour 
estimates are based on own 
experience from current and 
previous positions. 
4.1 Should you clarify that the list is 
the WBS for Engineering only?  
The other groups will also have 
WBS's which you have only 
partially touched on. 
Added “from the Engineering 
perspective”. 
1.1.3 Maybe add Architectural, 
Geotechnical.  Should you be 
adding other department scopes, 
such as QA, Procurement, 
Construction, 
Startup/Commissioning, 
Customers/Owner's Scope.  
Understanding these groups 
scopes (ie, the DOR between 
these groups and Engineering) 
will help define deliverables and 
associated WBS needs. 
These disciplines follow the SDP, 
identified in IP-ENG-001, 
Attachment 10. 
 
Table 53. Part I SME #1 Comments and Resolutions 
 
   
 
163 
Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
1.1.4 Maybe indicate "Proposed 
Design Change/Problem 
Resolution" 
Also, I think this should be listed 
ahead of the Project Scope.  
Unless, this is meant to be the 
"Detailed Project Scope". 
Changed to “Proposed Design 
Change/Problem Resolution.” 
1.1 Suggest adding a section on 
defining resources needed versus 
resources available.  Performing 
skills gap analysis and making 
decisions to self-perform 
engineering or sub-contracting 
out the work to third parties who 
already possess the necessary 
skills.  By defining what will be 
self-performed and what will be 
sub-contracted will in turn define 
what activates to include in the 
WBS. 
Added new 1.1.3 for identifying 
resources needed. 
1.1.5 Suggest listing the different types 
of design input:  Existing plant 
licensing and design information; 
New Design Functional and 
Performance Criteria; Regulatory 
Requirements; Design Codes and 
Standards; Customer/Owner's 
operations and maintenance 
criteria; Commissioning and 
Testing features to be 
incorporated into the design; 
physical layout and spatial 
criteria; engineering discipline 
department standards and 
guidelines; Owner preferred 
supplier information,.   You 
could expand the list further. 
This is explained in Section 4.2 
and references the programs 
identified in the SPD.  
 If you want to, you could further 
identify design inputs associated 
with every program the 
Customer/Owner has.  (e.g, Fire 




Table 53. Continued 
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Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
 The exercise of defining all of 
the design inputs helps define the 
design outputs needed for the 
Project. 
 
1.2.1 This is item 1.1.5.  Do you need 
to repeat here? 
The purpose of the repeat is to 
ensure that the responsible 
engineer is constantly 
communicating with the 
customer’s design engineering 
group. 
1.2.4 General comment:  It will be 
difficult to provide meaningful 
engineering rates without 
identifying the specific 
documents that each discipline 
works with. 
Those details are shown in section 
4.2 where a specific scope of work 
is provided, including documents 
to be created or updated. 
1.2.1.2, 1.2.2.2, etc 
 
(Numbering needs to 
be reviewed/corrected;  
these numbers should 
be 1.2.4.2, 1.2.5.2, etc) 
Is this meant to include all 
reviews, including customer 
reviews? 
 
General question applicable to all 
documents listed. 
 
See comment against 1.6.1 
Yes, but mainly aimed at 
reviews/verifications performed 
by the firm, which will be 
estimated in Section 4.2 for a 
specific work scope.  
 
Numbering has been updated. 
1.2.8.1  (Same 
comment for 
numbering as above) 
Do you want to list some of these 
other documents:  Equipment 
Data Sheets, Motor Data Sheets,  
Instrument Data Sheets. 
equipment lists, electrical load 
lists, instrument lists, cable and 
raceway lists, cable connection 
lists, pipe and valve lists, pipe 
hangar lists, EQ equipment lists; 
Equipment supplier documents, 
engineering service supplier 
documents; BOMs. 
 
The above could be condensed in 
generic categories of Data 
Sheets, Component Lists, 
Supplier Documents, BOMs. 
Added data sheets, components 
lists, and supplier documents as 
examples under 1.2.11, other 
documents.  




Table 53. Continued 
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Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
1.3.3.3 Coordinate with Owner as well.  
Or, is this this just part of the 
BOM review/approve cycle in 
1.2.8.2? 
Updated 1.3.3.1 to “obtain input 
from customer (e.g. procurement, 
engineering, installing group).” 
 
1.3.4.1 Maybe indicate both Owner's 
testing group as well as whoever 
is contracted to perform the 
testing? 
Updated to “Obtain Input from 
Customer (e.g. test group).” 
1.6.1 You have these reviews listed 
here, but also include them in 
Section 1.2.  Seems redundant. 
The reviews listed under 1.2 are 
for processes outside of the design 
package. The reviews listed under 
1.6.1 are for the design package. 
Updated 1.6.1 to “Design Package 
Inter-Discipline 
Review/Verification.” 
1.6.1 Suggest adding "Inter-discipline 
Reviews." 
See previous response.  
2 Suggest adding: "Performance 
test acceptance report reviews." 
Added as 2.3. 
1.2 It might be better to list all the 
documents in one section, then 
list the sequencing of review and 
processing that is typical for each 
document.  When done this way, 
you can expand upon the list of 
reviewer/verifiers instead of in 
1.6.1 
See response for 1.6.1. 
 














SME Title: Structural Engineer  
Description of SME Experience: 
Structural engineer of plant mods at nuclear power plants. 
 
Scope: Review Part I of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how 
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 
Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
4.1 / 1.2.1 This seems to be from the 
perspective of an outside 
contractor. Recommend reword 
to 5 guys meeting or equivalent 
Added “Customer’s” to specify. 
1.2.5.1 
 
Recommend “station” procedures 
to differentiate between 
installation procedures 
Changed 1.2.8.1 (updated number) 
to “Update/Generate 
Administrative and Installation 
Procedures” 
1.2.4 thru 1.2.11 
 
Numbering doesn’t match higher 
tier 
Updated numbering. 
1.3.2.1 The engineer writes the 
instructions, may need to add 
some language, sounds like the 
installer is doing this. The 
installer reviews the package, but 
doesn’t write the instructions. 
Similar for 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 
Changed to “Obtain Input 
from…” on 1.3.2.1, 1.3.3.1, and 
1.3.4.1. 
1.4.2.1 Typically only updates to the 
SAR are provided, the station 
updates the sar all at one time 
Changed to “Identify 
Recommended Changes to the 
SAR.” 
1.4.4.1 Update if required, not always 
required 
Changed to “Identify 




Written from an outside firm’s 
perspective, may want to keep it 
to a station’s wbs. An outside 
firm would be working to an 
augmented program. 
The case study is based on an 
outside firm doing the work.  
1.6.4 
 
Should you add “and get final 
signatures”? The activities make 
sense, but may want to show that 
these are part of the design phase 
before the package is approved. 
Added 1.6.5, “Final signatures and 
approval.” 
2.2 Add “minor” changes Added. 
2.3 Return “SSC” to service Added “SSC.” 
Table 54. Part I SME #2 Comments and Resolutions 




SME Title: Project Manager 
Description of SME Experience: 
Project manager for nuclear plant design modifications with more than 15 years of technical 
engineering experience. 
 
Scope: Review Part I of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how 
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 
Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
Introduction and 
Literature Review 





Do you have to define this or 
have it more generalized? 
Updated. 
WBS 1.4.2 Define SAR. Defined. 
WBS 1.6.1.1 Define SME. Defined.  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Table 55. Part I SME #3 Comments and Resolutions




Part II Subject Matter Expert (SME) Review 
SME: #1 
SME Title: Project Engineer Electrical/I&C 
Description of SME Experience: 
35+ years in engineering, engineering supervision, engineering project management for fossil 
and nuclear power plant projects. 
Scope: Review Part II of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how 
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 
Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
Project Definition and 
Pre-Design Walkdown 
This is especially true for non-
safety related designs as the 
plant's configuration control 
tends to put more focus on the 
safety-related design. 
Agree. Added some explanation. 
Project Definition and 
Pre-Design Walkdown 
"Craft" is normally associated 
with construction personnel.  
Unless "craft" is a generic term 
in your writings, suggest that you 
indicate "plant operations and 
maintenance personnel".  "Craft" 
could be still considered a 
stakeholder since they are the 
customer to engineering's 
construction design and may 
have some insight as to 
constructability issues. 
Replaced “craft” with “plant 
operations and maintenance”. 
Project Definition and 
Pre-Design Walkdown 
Do you want to be using a 
command tense 'shall', instead of 
a recommendation tense, i.e., 
'should' (typical comment)? 
Replaced “shall” with “should” in 
most instances.  
Project Definition and 
Pre-Design Walkdown 
Suggest adding: For purposes of 
this simplified case, It will be 
assumed that there are no 
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Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
Project Definition and 
Pre-Design Walkdown 
Suggest adding: "For simplicity, 
engineering supervision, project 
management, and other overhead 
charges will be ignored when 
developing the estimate.  These 
charges are typically percentages 
of the direct engineering cost." 
Added. 
Design Inputs Does the SDP address schedule?  
This is what puts the demand on 
the resources.  For example, a 
modification needing to be 
incorporated in a future outage 
will be less demanding than one 
that needs to be incorporated in 
the upcoming outage. 
The SDP des not specifically 
discuss this subject.  
Design Inputs Are you adding more here?  or 
should this be "...etc.)" 
No. This bullet continues on the 
next one below.  
Design Inputs Goal of the Conceptual phase 
should be to take the design from 
a rough idea to one that has 
structure and legitimacy. All 
items potentially having a high 
risk impact on cost or 
acceptability should be 
identified, defined, and 
incorporated into the conceptual 
design.  Other risks can be 
cataloged in a risk register with 
mitigating strategies.   
 
Also, the type of documents 
created during the conceptual 
phase should be agreed to with 
the customer.  Different 
customers have different 
expectations. 
 
You could add this to Page 61 
discussion where you introduce 
the conceptual design phase. 
Added wording. 
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Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
Drawings Suggest putting this first as all 
design flows down from key 
documents. 
 
Also, note that in many 
organizations, the Mechanical 
Engineers are not the people 
doing the piping layout.  ME's 
know the mechanical system 
process information, selection of 
pipe class, and determination of 
the sizing.  Separate personnel 
typically do the piping routing, 
design of pipe supports, and 
perform the stress analysis.  
These can be other ME's or 
Piping designers.  C/S Engineers 
usually only get involved when 
there is a special attachment to a 
structure needed, or when a 
foundation is needed. 
Moved item.  
Drawings 'Design technician' may be more 
PC. 
Changed “drafter” to “design 
technician”. 
Drawings Double edge sword.  Designers 
are typically paid less per hour 
than engineers, particularly 
Principal engineers.  Unless PE 
has good working cad skills, the 
task should be left to a design 
technician. 
 
What you generally find is the 
most senior engineers do not 
have these skills.  I do agree that 
it should be the company's goal 
that the young engineers acquire 
these skills as early in their 
careers as possible for the 
reasons you state. 
Agree. 
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Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
Drawings And in what format?  We have 
people who know only 
Microstation and don't know 
Autocad, and vice-a-versa.  This 
plays into the required skills of 
the resources and the job-hour 
estimates. 
Added. 
Calculations Change “future” to “later” Updated. 
Specifications Some amount of time is needed 
to specify the valve either on a 
BOM or on a procurement 
requisition.   
 
This detail is likely not important 
with regards to what you are 
trying to present, but I felt I 
should mention. 
This information accounted for in 
the “Bill of materials” section. 
Procedures I note that the procedures here 
are the plant operating 
procedures rather than the design 
change package and supporting 
document procedures.  Maybe 
clarify? 
 




YES!  I agree 100%.  Not 
recognizing how the design will 
be tested or commissioned is a 
major source of under-estimates. 
 
Key stakeholders in the 
conceptual design phase are the 




Table 56. Continued 
 
 




SME Title: Structural Engineer 
Description of SME Experience: 
15 years of structural design of nuclear facilities  
 
 
Scope: Review Part II of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how 
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 
Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
4.2 2nd paragraph, change “divided in 
phases” to “divided into phases” 
Updated to “into”. 
Page 61, before bullets You’re jumping right into a 
project, but it would be helpful to 
explain the scoping that was 
already performed. For example, 
why are they installing the drain 
line? 
Added background information.  
Page 62 
 
A more realistic resource 
allocation would be something 
less than 100% utilization, 
possibly 7 hours/day 
Changed to 7 hours/day. 
Page 62, last 
paragraph before Pre-
Job Brief 
Change “As stated in previously” 
to “As stated previously” 
Updated. 
Page 63 Typo “led” to “lead” This is the past tense for lead.  
Page 63 
 
Note that procedures are not 




Wouldn’t the scope start in the 
PJB? Then be expanded or 
confirmed during the walkdown 
Added “Pre-job briefs are also an 




Change “contains accurate 
information” to contains accurate 
or complete information” 
Updated. 
Page 66 Change ” that under 
consideration” to “that into 
consideration” 
Updated. 
Page 66 Delete “Same applies to any 
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Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
Page 70 – cad 
paragraph 
I don’t agree with using 
engineers to do drafting; doesn’t 
seem like an efficient use of 




Doesn’t the pipe support need a 
calculation? 
Added calculation for pipe 
support, including person-hour 
estimate. 
Page 73 - TR Change “only add a drain line to 
FWT” to “only adds a drain line 
to FWT” 
 
Change “assumed that not” to 




“radioactive area” should be 
“radiation controlled area” 
Updated. 
 
Table 57. Continued 
 




SME Title: Project Manager 
Description of SME Experience: 
Project manager for nuclear plant design modifications with more than 15 years of technical 
engineering experience. 
 
Scope: Review Part II of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on how 
to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 
Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
Section 4.2 Editorial comments. Markup 
provided.  
Updated. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Table 58. Part II SME #3 Comments and Resolutions




Part III Subject Matter Expert (SME) Review 
SME: #1 
SME Title: Project Engineer Electrical/I&C 
Description of SME Experience: 
35+ years in engineering, engineering supervision, engineering project management for fossil 
and nuclear power plant projects. 
Scope: Review Part III of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on 
how to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 
Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
All Editorial comments throughout.  Updated. 
 
4.3.5 
Need to identify “FM 1.1” in the 
writeup. “FM 1.2” is identified, 
but not FM 1.1  
This has been added as part of 
Chapter 5, under conclusions. 
 
4.3.22 
You might want to contrast your 
conclusions to the QA program 
and procedures the work is being 
done under.  I think you will find 
that many of the risks are already 
addressed by the program and 
procedures if the design is safety 
related, but less so for non-safety 
related work. This gap analysis 
will help focus on what else 
should be done to mitigate risk 
beyond what the current program 
already addresses. 
This has been added as part of 
Chapter 5, under 
recommendations. 
 Following on from previous 
comment, do you have any 
suggestions for the reader on 
how to deal with the identified 
risks for this sample project?  
Should you inflate the budget?  
Adjust schedule? Get different 
resources? 
Updated. 
   
   
   
 
Table 59. Part III SME #1 Comments and Resolutions 
 




SME Title: Structural Engineer 
Description of SME Experience: 
Structural engineer of plant mods at nuclear power plants. 
 
Scope: Review Part III of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on 
how to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 
Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
 
4.3.2 
“engineers experience” to 
“experience and capability of the 
resource engineers” 
Updated. 
4.3.2 last sentence 
 
Remove “generated” Removed. 
4.3.3 
 
“engineers experience” to 
“experience and capability of the 
resource engineers” 
Updated. 
4.3.9 2nd sentence 
 
Change “sine” to “since” Updated. 
Figure 4.3-5 
Table 4.3-8 
FM.5.2, severity shown as 5 but 
listed as 2, RPN calculated based 
on S=5 
Updated to 2. 
4.3.12 
 
Detection for calculation errors 
should be higher, as it is very 
difficult to detect errors. 
Recommend at least 3. 
Updated to 3. 
Figure 4.3-11 
 
Occurrence and detection should 
be at least 1 notch higher, based 
on my experience. 
Occurrence and detection updated 
to 2 and 3, respectively.  
4.3.20 2nd sentence “reminder” to “remainder” Updated. 
4.3.20 First you say detection is 3, then 
detection is 7. I see where the 
different FM16’s have 3 and 7 in 
the table, it just isn’t clear in the 
write up. Maybe need to just 
point to the table for a 
description. 
Added explanation.  
   
   
   
   
 
Table 60. Part III SME #2 Comments and Resolutions 




SME Title: Project Manager 
Description of SME Experience: 
Project manager for nuclear plant design modifications with more than 15 years of technical 
engineering experience. 
 
Scope: Review Part III of the case study and provide comments and/or recommendations on 
how to improve the content based on your experience with design engineering projects. 
 
Section/Table/Figure Comment/Recommendation Resolution 
Section 4.3 Editorial comments. Markup 
provided.  
Updated. 
4.3.17 Define SAR. SAR has been defined. 
All 4.3.x Remove sentence “The engineers 
in this case study are 
experienced…” and “Therefore 
an occurrence…” These 
sentences are repetitive.  
Removed sentences from 
individual section. Added overall 
statement to Section 4.3.4. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Table 61. Part III SME #3 Comments and Resolutions 
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